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ABSTRACT

The following study addresses the contentious issue of Swiss economic policy
during the Second World War. In particular, it concentrates on the deterioration of
Swiss-American relations that resulted from Switzerland’s economic ties to Nazi
Germany. It is argued that Switzerland’s survival as a neutral and democratic country
depended less on the defense preparations of the Swiss Army and more on the difficult
trade negotiations with both the Axis and Allies. Varied sources that include American
and Swiss governmental reports, diplomatic documents, and contemporary accounts of
the war, support the argument that although moral considerations played a secondary role
to economic necessities, Switzerland’s trade with Nazi Germany did not prolong the
Second World War nor were such ties immoral in nature. Instead, the inability or
unwillingness of Allied countries like the United States and Great Britain to provide
Switzerland with much-needed raw materials and food imports led the neutral country to
forge closer ties with the Axis. The emphasis of the study is to assess accurately
Switzerland’s wartime economic conduct and is not meant to provide an apologetic
rationalization of its relationship with Nazi Germany.
After first considering the historical origins of Switzerland’s neutrality and its
economic and political institutions, the study proceeds to examine the immediate effects
of its foreign trade policy and the longer-term consequences of the damaged relations
with the United States in the Cold War. The study closes by addressing the problems
stemming from the poly-ethnic and multi-cultural composition of the Swiss
Confederation that can provide excellent insight into the current dilemmas experienced
by European countries as they strive for political and economic integration.
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CHAPTER 1: THE UNIQUE FEATURES OF SWITZERLAND

Sixty years have elapsed since the end of World War Two. For Switzerland, time
has not repaired a tarnished image that resulted from its wartime conduct. The decision
to remain neutral, along with its willingness to trade with and purchase gold from Nazi
Germany continues to shape negatively perceptions of Switzerland held by the outside
world. Those who reproach the Swiss for their actions and policies fail to see the entire
picture and most often lack even the most basic understanding of their society and
government. Switzerland’s self-image as a small, armed neutral state clashes with
external views of the country as an immoral collaborator with Nazi Germany. These two
conflicting images create tremendous difficulties for the historian who aims at
uncovering what really happened inside Switzerland during the Second World War. The
key to understanding Switzerland’s experience in the Second World War lies in exposing
the unique features of Swiss society: the state maxim of neutrality, its highly specialized
and foreign trade-reliant economy, as well as its practice of direct democracy within a
decentralized, federalist government. It should become clear that although Switzerland
did remain outside the reach of formal military conflict it failed to avoid entanglement
within the economic war. Additionally, one must understand that Switzerland behaved
no worse than any other Western democracy. In fact, this study will show how neutral
Switzerland played a crucial role in preserving democracy on the European continent.
My thesis focuses on Swiss trade negotiations with both the Axis and Allied
governments, but I especially emphasize Switzerland’s relationships with the United
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States and Britain. The reason for examining this element of economic policy is that for
the Swiss, foreign policy is inseparable from trade policy, and it is within the realm of
economics that Switzerland faced its biggest challenges. Although the Swiss Army’s
defense preparations certainly were important for staving off invasion, the role of trade
policy was indispensable for Switzerland’s survival as an independent, democratic
country. At the heart of the controversial Swiss ties with Nazi Germany were issues of
foreign trade. By examining the dynamics of these bilateral trade negotiations, a reader
can better understand the true Swiss experience concerning World War Two. It is from
trade negotiations that Switzerland chose to accept Nazi gold and forge close links with
the Axis economies. It is also from trade negotiations that Swiss relations with the
United States and Great Britain soured.
While it is true that certain decisions made by the Swiss policy-making elite were
morally questionable-- such as the choice of the federal government to modify asylum
law to limit the influx of Jewish refugees-- I cannot blindly agree with the criticisms
unleashed on Switzerland by Western governments and other organizations. For
example, various groups like the World Jewish Congress attack Switzerland for the
asylum law restrictions but fail to acknowledge that proportionally, the Swiss accepted
more wartime refugees than the United States and Britain. Other accusations, like those
conveyed in a 1997 American State Department report, condemn Switzerland for its
immoral, “business as usual” attitude during World War Two, arguing that the small
neutral country profited handsomely from its trade relationship with Germany. 1 Such
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United States Department of State, U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and
Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II, coordinated by Stuart E. Eizenstat,
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attacks upon the national character of Switzerland ignore the truth that World War Two
represented a period of economic recession for the tiny alpine confederation. In addition,
Switzerland’s close trade ties to Nazi Germany resulted from years of economic
cooperation. These ties therefore, did not stem from a sudden, opportunistic shift on the
behalf of the Swiss government. My study will prove that Allied economic warfare
against Switzerland, which included trade embargoes, naval blockades, and asset
freezing, hurt the small neutral’s ability to survive more dramatically than similar Axis
efforts.
A study of Swiss foreign-trade policy serves a three-fold purpose. First, by
examining the central component of Switzerland’s foreign policy, we may better
understand how the Swiss became embroiled in economic warfare. Second, the
respective courses of economic action taken by all sides in dealing with Switzerland
foreshadowed non-economic problems during the war and beyond. These non-economic
issues include Switzerland’s role as a protecting power for prisoners-of-war and its
obligations as a neutral arbitrator during the Cold War era. Third, by illustrating the roots
of Swiss wartime trade policies, we may take lessons from World War Two that are
applicable today in the context of European political and economic integration.
In the course of examining trade negotiations, I shall also discuss the impact of
total warfare on the theory and practice of neutrality and on Switzerland’s role within the
international community. For Switzerland, declining respect for neutrality as a viable
foreign policy held dire consequences, as the country’s decision to remain apart from the
international community served to isolate it from the rest of the world. Comprehending
the importance of neutrality for Switzerland requires an overview of its historical
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development. Discussed in the remainder of this chapter are issues of identity, religion,
language, and economy that illustrate the unique features of Switzerland. Particular
attention is dedicated to the maxim of neutrality and the close link between Swiss foreign
policy and the country’s economic policy.
The Genesis of Swiss Neutrality, 1291-1815
The year 1291 marked the beginnings of the first Swiss confederation. Three
forest cantons, Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwald, signed treaties of alliance protecting them
from “the aggression of the wicked.” 2 In other words, each canton pledged to mediate
any conflicts arising between the others. The foundation of early neutrality rested on the
notion of Stille sitzen, or “sitting still,” during conflicts that did not directly affect the
allied cantons. Features of this type of defense alliance included a strictly internal
orientation, faith in the primacy of law, and reliance on mediation or arbitration to resolve
conflicts arising between the alliance members. Each signatory to the treaties of alliance
sought to join with the other cantons to combat the external threats they confronted.
Because Swiss territory lacked natural resources, few jobs existed for the people
living in the confederation. The dearth of employment opportunities led the Swiss to take
up arms as mercenaries, fighting the wars of European powers. Mercenary service
quickly became the primary form of employment for the Swiss. By the second half of the
fifteenth century, stronger cantons, such as Bern, desired to control weaker cantons like
Uri, leading to infighting, social unrest, and political instability. In an effort to prevent
the collapse of the early confederation, the cantons began the practice of barring enemies
from using Swiss territory for troop transit. To limit the possibilities of Swiss fighting

2

Jean Freymond, “Neutrality and Security Policy as Components of the Swiss Model,”
Government and Opposition 23 (1988): 52.
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one another, treaty members also agreed to refuse payment from enemies for mercenary
services.
With the arrival of the sixteenth century came the threat of political disintegration
for the Swiss cantons. Mercenary service during the Burgundian, and especially, the
Italian, wars of the sixteenth century threatened to tear the early confederation apart. The
battle of Marignano (1515) led to a ban on Swiss mercenaries serving on opposing sides
of wars. Efforts taken by the stronger cantons to increase their military and political
influence exposed divergent territorial aims among the confederation members. External
events, namely religious, diplomatic, and military clashes among European powers, led
the Swiss to seek safety inside their confederation. Those same quarrels indelibly
affected Switzerland. Divided along religious, linguistic, and cultural lines, the Swiss
sought recourse in the internal functions of neutrality. Due to irreconcilable differences
among the peoples of the Swiss cantons, neutrality served as a means of coping with the
lack of unity with which they constantly contended. Internally, neutrality acted as a
unifying force in the absence of common religious, linguistic, and cultural uniformity.
By constructing a political framework of neutrality and federalism, the confederates
sought to blur the different experiences and beliefs of the population into a
heterogeneous, but stable, society.
The pivotal roles played by the cities of Geneva and Zurich during the
Reformation tested the ability of a neutrality policy to preserve peace within the
confederation. Neutrality proved an essential ingredient for maintaining cohesion within
the sharply divided Catholic and Protestant cantons. Efforts at preserving the
confederation centered on utilizing neutrality to supersede divisive issues. Neutrality
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became the defining characteristic of Switzerland, allowing the confederates to feel as if
they belonged to something uniquely Swiss and beyond religion and language. As
religion continued to polarize Europe, Swiss political and religious leaders felt the need
to better define Switzerland’s place in European affairs. These leaders embraced
neutrality as a way of contributing to European diplomacy by offering impartial
arbitration.
The Thirty Years’ War again tested the capacity of the confederation to remain
unified. A scholar of neutrality, Hanspeter Neuhold, argues, “In the religious wars of the
16th and 17th centuries in Europe, taking sides would have been disastrous for the unity
and survival of the country.” 3 The scope of this European-wide conflict forced even
greater precision when defining neutrality policy. In what is termed the Défensional of
Wyl (1647), the leaders of the stronger cantons agreed to impose the policy of neutrality
on all members of the confederation to resist the centrifugal force of religion. The
confederates agreed to halt any further expansion, pledging to create a federal army to
protect the frontiers. It was thus in 1647 that the Swiss first adopted the principle of
neutrality as a “state maxim.” 4 The following year, in the Treaty of Westphalia,
Switzerland’s right to economic neutrality was alluded to, but not explicitly guaranteed.
During an armed conflict between two or more foreign powers, the Swiss could trade
with all sides without fear of military retribution. In exchange for this freedom, the Swiss
were expected to act fairly and without favoritism.

3

Hanspeter Neuhold, “The Neutral States of Europe: Similarities and Differences,” in Neutrality:
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103-4.
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One result of Switzerland’s maxim of neutrality was that Europe increasingly
trusted Swiss power. States like Britain and France saw the Swiss as contributing to a
European balance of power. In the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), France, Spain, Britain, and
the United Provinces of the Netherlands recognized Swiss neutrality. The Swiss worked
hard to secure this recognition, as they saw a need for external support for a policy of
neutrality. That treaty recognition forced the Swiss to reorient the direction of their
policy of neutrality. Previously, neutrality served as an internal mechanism to ensure
cohesion within the confederation. Henceforth, neutrality possessed both internal and
external functions. The Swiss state maxim now aimed to maintain stability inside the
confederation while also seeking acknowledgement of its right to abstain from foreign
military conflicts.
A century later, the European powers formally recognized the neutralization of
Switzerland in the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna (20 November 1815). As a
creation of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe, neutralization served to manage
and maintain the delicate balance of power system. In a study of neutralization, Cyril E.
Black offers a general definition:
A neutralized state is one whose political independence and
territorial integrity are guaranteed permanently by a
collective agreement of great powers, subject to the
conditions that the neutralized state will not take up arms
against another state, except to defend itself, and will not
assume treaty obligations which may compromise its
neutralized status. 5
Black’s definition addresses the situation that gave rise to the internationally
recognized neutral status of Switzerland after 1815. Under the conditions of the Final
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Act of the Congress of Vienna, Switzerland’s status as a neutralized state gained legal
codification and protections of international law. Writing in 1927, the legal scholar
Malbone W. Graham described the aim of the powers as ensuring “a return to a military,
diplomatic, and political equilibrium, a creation of a new balance of power.” 6
It is useful to envision neutralization as a process that produces a neutral state. If
neutralization is a process, then neutrality is a status.
The European powers derived four benefits from the neutralization of
Switzerland. First, neutralization aimed to stabilize a fragile international situation.
Second, in upholding the status quo, a neutralized state contributed to peace and
minimized the threats faced by small powers. Third, for the neutralized state, an
international guarantee of its status bolstered its own security efforts and acted to restrain
the ambitions of large powers. Fourth, from the perspective of large powers, recognizing
neutralized territories allowed them to manage the balance of power.
Neutralization presented many problems from the standpoint of international law
as well as those of neutralized states and of large powers. A neutralization agreement
required the convergence of interests on behalf of the guaranteeing powers and presented
substantial problems in terms of maintenance and enforcement. Regarding the
neutralization of Switzerland, the Congress of Vienna agreed to such a status as a
“conscious act of preventative diplomacy.” 7 In other words, by agreeing to the creation
of a neutralized Switzerland, the powers felt as if they were strengthening a fragile
system.

6

Malbone W. Graham, Jr., “Neutralization as a Movement in International Law,” American
Journal of International Law (January 1927): 82.
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Meeting at the Congress of Vienna, the European powers decided how best to deal with
the Swiss desire to remain neutral:
Accordingly, the signatory Powers of the Vienna
Declaration hereby set forth in the present act a formal and
authentic recognition of Swiss perpetual neutrality and
guarantee the integrity and inviolability of its territory. . . .
The Powers signatory to the Declaration of 20 March 1815
authoritatively recognize by the present act the Swiss
neutrality and inviolability and independence of any
foreign influence are to be considered in the true interest of
European policy. . . . 8
The Swiss viewed neutrality in terms of its obligations during wartime. It was
also seen as a peacetime policy, but primarily, it was interpreted as abstention from all
future wars. In the article “Background Factors of Swiss neutrality” Luzius Wildhaber
argues that Swiss interpretations of this policy “start[ed] from the ‘classical’ standpoint
that there [are] clear, empirically observable distinction[s] between the law and policy of
neutrality, between neutrality policy on the one hand and foreign policy at large on the
other hand, and between war and peace.” 9
In the nineteenth century, Switzerland’s permanent neutrality depended upon
fulfilling three main criteria: (1) abstaining from foreign wars, (2) maintaining national
defense capabilities, and (3) avoiding “policies and actions that might on some future
occasion involve it in hostilities.” 10 At the core of Switzerland’s neutrality policy is the
feature of abstention. Simply, this means a neutral state must avoid actions or policies
that might entangle it in an armed conflict. A neutral cannot assist belligerents
economically, militarily, or otherwise, in wartime. Hanspeter Neuhold notes, “In
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Gordon E. Sherman, “The Neutrality of Switzerland, I: The Vienna Treaties,” American Journal
of International Law (April 1918): 249.
9
Luzius Wildhaber, “Background Factors of Swiss Neutrality,” in Neutrality and Non-Alignment
in Europe, eds., Karl E. Birnbaum and Hanspeter Neuhold (Vienna: Wihelm Braumüller), 20.
10
Black, et al., Neutralization, 22
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accordance with the principle of abstention, neutral states must not provide military
assistance to belligerents.” He continues by arguing, “Given the absolute character of
this prohibition, a neutral would also violate it even if it observed strict impartiality,
another cornerstone of neutrality, by furnishing exactly the same kind and amount of
military aid to all warring parties.” 11 A second obligation of a permanent neutral is the
duty of prevention. In accordance with its international obligations set forth in 1815,
Switzerland had to repel by force if necessary any threat from a belligerent.
Connected to the feature of abstention is the intermediate position
(Zwischenstellung) of a neutral in respect to each warring party. This position is
exhibited in both a symmetrical or asymmetrical dynamic between neutrals and
belligerents. The First World War, for example, was a symmetrical situation for
Switzerland because conditions of relative equilibrium existed between the two warring
factions. In the Second World War, by contrast, the asymmetrical conditions between the
Allied and Axis powers greatly compromised Switzerland’s negotiating position. 12 A
neutral aims to adopt a policy that follows a middle ground between an overly weak
position of neutrality and that of a dominating position “such that its own military power
is great enough to deter a potential aggressor but not important enough to play an
excessively ambitious role.” By adhering to such a middle-of-the-road policy, the neutral
state is able to “shorten the distance between itself and the belligerent, thereby reducing
the threat of involvement.” 13

11

Neuhold, “The Neutral States,” 98.
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A symmetrical dynamic exists for a neutral state if military, political, diplomatic,
and legal relations between the belligerent blocs are comparable. Conversely, asymmetry
is evident if these factors unequally favor one belligerent over another. Closely tied to
the intermediate position are the concerns of impartiality and partiality. The distinction
between these terms is affected by the policies of a neutral state for conducting its
relations with opposing belligerent factions. 14 In the context of total war with its attached
ideological and moral dimensions, impartiality became increasingly difficult to maintain.
Switzerland could remain neutral so long as it took no direct or indirect part in
hostilities. The Swiss government fulfilled its obligations as a permanent neutral if
declared to remain neutral in advance of all future wars and if it signed treaties with other
states (which it did). By meeting all conditions for permanent neutrality, Switzerland
surpassed the requirements of a neutralized state. Thus, Switzerland began to set itself
apart from other neutrals. A reader must keep in mind that though Switzerland
approached neutrality as if it were constitutional law, it was in fact solely a policy, or a
“fundamental maxim.” 15
Permanent neutrality encompasses military, political, and economic components.
In the Swiss case especially, it does not include moral neutrality, ideological neutrality or
neutrality of opinion. It implies neutrality of the state, never neutrality of the individual.
Militarily speaking, the permanent neutral maintains a triangular relationship between
itself and two opposing belligerent blocs. Politically, a permanent neutral is forbidden
from entering into defensive alliances, treaties of guarantee, and collective security
arrangements. Economically, a state like Switzerland “must not enter into a customs or
14

Daniel Frei, Dimensionen neutraler Politik: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der internationalen
Beziehungen (Geneva: Institut universitaire des hautes études internationales, 1969), 21-91 and 103-47.
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economic union which might in any way jeopardize its independence of political action.”
The danger of doing so is that “the neutral state might become dependent on its economic
partner,” leading possibly to military or diplomatic entanglements. 16 As we will see, in
the Second World War, Switzerland failed to avoid economic integration with German
because of the Allies’ unwillingness to furnish the neutral state with much-needed food
and raw materials.
Modern scholars view neutralization as a flexible and narrowly applicable
concept. According to Cyril Black, “Neutralization, in effect, is a formal status of
permanent neutrality. The specific attributes of the status reflect the outcome of
international negotiations.” He emphasizes, “There is no single, clearly specifiable
concept of neutralization but rather a variety of potential forms available to express the
particular convergence of negotiating interests that results in a neutralization
agreement.” 17 Difficulties in defining neutrality continued to plague Swiss leaders
throughout the nineteenth century. The formal recognition of Swiss neutrality, however,
ended more than five hundred years of evolution for the confederation’s state maxim.
Permanent neutrality for the Swiss was far more than merely a foreign policy line.
The doctrine became for Switzerland a traditional symbol, having reached the
“significance of myth.” 18 Neutrality represented a national ethos and a means of
compensating for the problems of identity faced by a small state with no ambitions of
territorial expansion. Two additional factors are critical for understanding the importance
of neutrality for the Swiss and how deeply rooted the concept is embedded in the
16

Black, et al., 23-4.
Ibid., vi.
18
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Cambridge University Press, 1989), 23.
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consciousness of the Swiss people. First, Switzerland consistently lacked any viable
alternatives to neutrality policy. Any possible alternatives were never nearly as attractive
as neutrality. The second factor was the need for internal cohesion, which neutrality
provided. 19
Within the context of Swiss identity, there is a commonly held belief that the
political uniqueness, or Sonderfall, of the country fosters a small-state mentality of
introversion, referred to as Kleinstaatlichkeit in German. 20 Former Federal Councilor
Max Petitpierre accurately summarizes the importance of neutrality and federalism for
constructing the identity and national values of the Swiss Confederation. As an ardent
defender of Swiss neutrality, Petitpierre asserts,
Neutrality plus federalism have made Switzerland a nation.
Neutrality and federalism arose from the same need: to
ensure union amongst the Confederates and then the unity
of the country, one of the essential components of this unity
being respect for dissimilarities. . . . Federalism formed a
whole out of the many disparate elements of which the
Confederation was composed.
He further argues that federalism, neutrality, and the instruments of Swiss direct
democracy, like the referendum, empowered the Swiss people as “the sovereigns of the
country.” 21 Schematically, direct democracy underlies the political organization of Swiss
communities. Federalism acts as the means of managing inter-communal and intercantonal relations. Neutrality represents the foundation for this “inter-communal
system.” 22 To explain the changes made to Swiss neutrality during the remainder of the
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nineteenth century, it is necessary to discuss the development of Swiss political
institutions.
The Swiss Political Structure
Prior to the formal recognition of Swiss neutrality at Vienna, the early
confederation faced considerable political challenges. Before Napoleon invaded Swiss
territory in 1798, the loose federation of cantons suffered from unequal distribution of
political power. Thirteen cantons composed this early Swiss state, logically named the
Confederation of the Thirteen Cantons. Some cantons, like Bern and Zurich, held much
political sway, while others, such as Glarus, did not. The looseness of this federation
meant the inclusion of allied members who lacked full political power. The cantons of
St. Gallen and the Grisons were such allies. Other cantons held even less influence. For
example, the cantons of Vaud and Western Aargau answered to the most powerful
canton, Bern, and existed as colonies or dependencies. The weakest affiliation a canton
could have in this decentralized arrangement was the status of “colonial dominion.” 23
The cantons of Thurgau and Southern Tessin held such status within the confederation.
Wealthy elites and influential guild members sought to impose hierarchical
political and social structures. They envisioned a system wherein the rural poor occupied
the base of these structures while the rich and powerful composed its apex. Because of
Switzerland’s lack of a titled aristocracy and its inherently decentralized political and
social frameworks, such a system never gained the acceptance of the poor. The 1798
invasion of Bern and Vaud by Napoleon’s armies compounded the problems faced by
Switzerland’s elite. Swiss territory succumbed to invasion swiftly because of two factors.
First, no unified military command structure existed. Second, the primacy of cantonal
23

René Levy, The Social Structure of Switzerland (Zurich: Pro Helvetia Arts Council, 1998), 93.
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sovereignty over that of federal sovereignty demonstrated the shortsightedness of relying
on the voluntary cooperation of the individual cantons. Bonaparte imposed a constitution
on the newly-created 19 cantonal areas giving an illusion of sovereignty. In reality,
France dictated both domestic and foreign policies within Switzerland.
By 1803, the confederation proved incapable of functioning. Through Napoleon’s
Mediation Act, a confederation of cantons arose based on the American federal model,
named the Republic of Switzerland. 24 The decentralized structure of this model
functioned well. The defeat of Napoleon in 1814 presented the new confederation with a
political predicament: what shape should the country now assume? The Swiss Diet
quickly reached a solution. Under the Pact of 1815, internal and external security,
organization and deployment of troops, and the appointment of the army general staff fell
within the jurisdiction of the federal government. The cantons were responsible for
training and other measures of military preparedness. 25 Napoleon himself had realized
the urgent need for Switzerland to adopt a federated political structure. In 1802, he
conveyed his experience managing the multi-lingual, multi-religious, and multi-cultural
Swiss Confederation: “I would consider myself incapable of governing the Swiss. The
more I think about [Switzerland], the more convinced I become that the disparity between
its constituent parts makes it impossible to impose a common pattern on it: everything
points to federalism.” 26
The Vienna settlement recognized the sovereignty and neutrality of Switzerland,
yet the internal organization of the state remained an unresolved problem. The Pact of

24
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1815 sought to rectify this issue. An alliance among the cantons emerged whereby each
canton enjoyed equal power. The aim was to reduce the power disparity that
characterized the pre-1798 confederation. Although each canton was equal within the
confederation, it remained autonomous in terms of local affairs. Between 1815 and 1830,
the new country experienced a political restoration that returned the pre-Napoleonic
conservative elites to power. Especially within the Catholic cantons, these leaders
curtailed the liberal political freedoms granted by the Pact of 1815.
In the years leading up to the Swiss civil war, the Sonderbund War of 1847,
politically liberal and radical Protestants sought to combat the escalating dominance of
the Catholic conservative leadership. After a short but bloody conflict that divided the
country along religious lines, the liberals and radicals succeeded in suppressing Catholic
separatism and broke the conservative hold on political power. 27 Taking advantage of
their recent victory, the liberal/radical leadership proclaimed the Swiss Constitution, thus
creating modern Switzerland. The liberals and radicals sought a majority-based, strong
central government. Similar to their conservative rivals, the liberal/radical interests led to
rule by “economic barons.” 28 Business interests firmly entrenched themselves early in
the life of modern Switzerland. The primacy of economic interests gave rise to a
democratic movement opposed to rule by business elites. In 1874, the democrats
succeeded in obtaining important constitutional revisions. The result was a second Swiss
Constitution.
Prior to the revision of the constitution, the liberal/radical leadership sought to
deemphasize the role of the churches in Swiss social and political life in an effort to avoid
27
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28
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the religious upheavals of the Sonderbund era. 29 The 1874 constitution included
sweeping anticlerical measures that led to outrage on behalf of the Catholic/conservative
elites. Secularization efforts met with fierce resistance from the Catholic/conservative
elements inside the new Swiss state. The political battle between the liberal/radical
Protestants and Catholic conservatives lasted until the early 1891, when all parties agreed
to reconcile their differences to ensure the future prosperity of Switzerland. The
introduction of direct democratic mechanisms, like referenda and initiatives in the 1890s,
served as a crucial component of the reconciliation efforts. 30
Article 3 of the 1874 constitution stated that all powers not granted to the federal
government were left to the cantons. 31 As a legacy of the civil war era, the political
division between federal and cantonal authority led to a bicameral legislative branch.
Within the Ständerat, or Upper House, cantonal sovereignty is preserved. In the
Ständerat, each of Switzerland’s 20 full cantons elects two representatives. Smaller,
half-cantons like Basel-Stadt and Basel-Land each elects one representative to the
Ständerat. The Swiss Nationalrat, or Lower House, elected its members by a majorityrule system until the introduction of proportional representation in 1919.
When both houses convene together as the Bundesversammlung, or Federal
Assembly, they elect the Bundesrat, or Federal Council, Switzerland’s unique sevenmember executive branch. The election process is carried through by secret ballot.
Elected every four years at the beginning of a new parliament, the Federal Councilors
each assume the position of a Vorsteher, acting as the chief of one of Switzerland’s seven
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executive ministries. Once per year, a Federal Councilor becomes the President of
Switzerland while another is chosen as Vice President. Long-serving federal councilors
may serve as President more than once, just not in consecutive years. The tradition
remains to this day that the Federal Council acts as a collective entity with one voice and
one opinion.
The Gemeinde, or commune, represents the most basic unit of Swiss political life.
Communes possess the same degree of semi-sovereignty within cantons as the cantons
have within the federal government. Like cantons, powers not enumerated to the federal
or cantonal governments fall upon the communes. Inhabitants of Switzerland since the
creation of the modern confederation are actually not citizens of the country, but rather,
citizens of their Bürgerort, or commune of origin. As a whole, the citizens are “the
sovereign” of Switzerland. 32 Although the high level of direct involvement in politics
leads to an efficient system of governance, it tends to make political life boring. Parties
themselves play a vital role in local, cantonal, and federal politics, creating a complete
politicization of daily life. The historian Jonathan Steinberg argues, “The total
politicization of Swiss life leads to its opposite, a lifelessness in daily politics and an
indifference to it.” 33
One reason for this indifference is the system of direct democracy itself.
Constantly voting for referenda at the local, cantonal, and federal levels contributes to a
mundane political atmosphere. Another factor in creating this indifference is that at all
three levels political leaders traditionally hold their offices for long periods. Political
longevity results from a remarkable degree of stability in voting patterns among the
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confederation’s citizens. Finally, lacking a common language to conduct debates, Swiss
linguistic diversity adds to the indifference towards daily political life.
The Four National Languages, Identity, and the Role of Neutrality
Internal pressures that resulted from the linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity
of Switzerland presented serious problems for identity in the nineteenth century. While
neutrality offered a means of ensuring internal cohesion, the reality of four national
languages denied the Swiss any chance of a universal identity. Jonathan Steinberg
writes, “Language defines and at the same time denies Swiss identity; it reinforces the
peculiarities of political practice and reflects them. Above all, it contributes to the
bewildering variety in a small area which makes it hard to say anything general about
Switzerland.” 34 Speakers of Schwyzerdütsch (Swiss-German), French, Italian, and
Raeto-Romansch all vied for their linguistic place within Swiss society during the
nineteenth century.
Especially for Swiss-German speakers, dialect reflects identity. Many different
Mundarte, Swiss-German for dialects, exist within the German-speaking areas of
Switzerland. If, for Britons, language reflected class during the nineteenth century, for
Swiss Germans, language reflected regional differences. The fact that political debates
are conducted in High German and that written Schriftdeutsch differs considerably from
Schwyzerdütsch historically presented serious problems for pan-Swiss communication.
Swiss-German never has been a written language and for outsiders, learning its
intricacies proves nearly impossible. Likewise, for Swiss Germans themselves, the gulf
between High German and Schwyzerdütsch isolates Switzerland from Germany and
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Austria. For foreigners, the complicated mosaic of German-speaking Switzerland
“makes it hard to get ‘inside Switzerland’ or to get to know Swiss Germans.” 35
German-speaking Swiss comprise approximately 70 percent of the population.
Suisses romands, or French-speaking Swiss, make up the dominant language group in six
cantons. Overall, Swiss-French lacks dialects, which sets it apart from Swiss-German.
What defines Suisse romand culture is less clear than in the case of Swiss-German
regions. French-speaking Swiss view Paris as their cultural epicenter. Because of this
affinity for Parisian life, it is difficult to identify a concrete Suisse romand identity.
Complicating matters, the six French-speaking cantons are not geographically
contiguous, nor are they united by a common culture. Perhaps the biggest difference
between French- and German-speaking Switzerland is that Suisses romands are
predominately Protestant, while the Swiss-Germans are mostly Catholic.
Adding to the complicated mosaic of Swiss linguistic culture is the presence of
two smaller regions, the Italian-speaking Ticino, and the Raeto-Romanic canton of
Graübunden. Swiss-Italian speakers, like Suisses romands, view Italy as their cultural
center. Like Swiss Germans, Italian speakers within Switzerland utilize many dialects
that reflect local differences. While German speakers utilize two levels of speech, Italian
speakers have three: the local dialect, the general dialect of Lombardy, and the literary
high Italian. If German speakers use High German as a secondary language, Italian
speakers rely on the Lombard dialect to compensate for local linguistic differences.
A major difference between German Switzerland and Italian Switzerland is that in the
former, dialect reflects regional differences; in the latter, it reflects class, sex, age and
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other social inequalities. Both types of linguistic dialect reflect an intimacy that is hard
for an outsider to penetrate.
Speakers of Raeto-Romansch represent a dying language, spoken only in isolated
alpine valleys within the canton of Graübunden. Efforts to resurrect the language proved
unsuccessful during the nineteenth century. The combination of alpine depopulation and
the dominance of Swiss-German contributed to the decline of Raeto-Romansch language
and culture. Entering the twentieth century, less than one percent of the population spoke
Raeto-Romansch, with that number declining rapidly. 36 Nevertheless, the presence of
this fourth language inside Switzerland remains a unique feature of the country.
Within the Swiss government, at all three levels, Italian Swiss are overrepresented while Suisses romands hold their fair share of positions. German Swiss are
likewise represented adequately, although their influence is more significant than any of
the other three linguistic groups. Swiss Germans dominate finance, banking, the machine
tool industry, and even the watch-making profession. German speakers also dominate
commercial and trade associations that play vital roles in Swiss business and
manufacturing. Suisse romands tend to specialize in smaller, more traditional banking
enterprises. Compared to their German-speaking counterparts, in international finance
Suisses romands are disadvantaged due to their unwillingness to learn High German and
English. At a basic level, the centralism of French culture clashes with the federalism
favored by the Swiss-German population.
Jonathan Steinberg points out that the development of Swiss culture deviated
from the norms set forth by Johann Gottfried Herder in the eighteenth century. Herder
argued that a common Sprache, or language, united the Volk, or people, of a country. He
36
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saw the two as mutually reinforcing. Steinberg acknowledges this to be true for most
countries, but that Switzerland presented an exception to the rule during its modern
development. He states, “The Swiss are a Volk, because geography, history, political
structures, and linguistic diversity have made them one, but also because all Swiss
whether French, German, or Italian in language, participate in one national economy,
whose features reinforce the other characteristics.” 37
Swiss Micro-Capitalism and Economic Development
The Industrial Revolution affected Switzerland differently than its neighbors.
Between the years 1798 and 1830, Switzerland embarked on a unique path of industrial
modernization. Compared to British industrialization, for example, Switzerland
experienced the related social revolution more slowly. Unlike British and German
industrialization, Swiss economic modernization did not destroy the traditional cellular
structure of the political framework. Modernization did, however, reshape Switzerland’s
economic structure, albeit slowly and in a uniquely Swiss way. By 1800, 25 percent of
Swiss labor found employment within the craft and trade sectors. 38 The watch industry
emerged in the seventeenth century in French-speaking areas surrounding Geneva and the
Jura mountains. The next key industry to develop, textiles, became concentrated in the
German-speaking areas of Zurich and St. Gallen, although it spread as far as Fribourg in
Western Switzerland.
In the nineteenth century, the watch industry experienced few innovations while
the textile industry’s growth proved explosive. Ancillary branches grew slowly out of the
watch and textile sectors. These branches soon developed into the machine, the
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electrical, and the chemical/dyestuff industries. The growth of these sectors was aided
greatly by the development of railways and the abolition of cantonal and local tolls in
1848. In turn, the rise of the railroad led to an expansion of the banking, and later, the
insurance sectors.
A key feature of Swiss industrialization was the early realization that in the textile
sector, St. Gallen producers needed to specialize in high-quality goods for the export
market. Because of high costs for transportation and imports, Switzerland developed a
specialized, luxury-goods based economy. The high degree of specialization led to the
formation of many economic “micro-societies” that “fitted into existing political units.” 39
The dependency on its export sector created marked vulnerability to foreign competition,
especially since the textile, machinery, and watch industries lacked a domestic market
upon which to fall back.
Swiss industries followed a pattern of pre-industrial development that Karl Marx
termed “heterogeneous.” Marx referred to the Swiss watch-making industry as the
archetype of this heterogeneous development. Following the putting-out system, Swiss
watchmakers assembled pieces simultaneously, in no particular order, in many different
workshops. Under the Swiss putting-out system, the capitalists held little capital, but also
needed little due to the decentralized nature of this development pattern.
The decentralized settlement pattern of Swiss people contributed to relatively
amicable employer-employee relations, despite huge inequalities of income and capital
ownership. In fact, Switzerland was the most economically unequal society in Europe.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the richest 20 percent of the
population earned 44.6 percent of the total national income. By contrast, the poorest 20
39
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percent earned 5.2 percent of the national income. 40 Industrialization produced less
worker strife than in neighboring countries, but Switzerland did experience mass poverty,
unemployment, poor working conditions, and industrial accidents. The smaller units of
Swiss “micro-capitalism” allowed for less of a percentage of production to fall under the
restrictions of factory legislation.
Impoverishment, unemployment, and industrial heath risks led the federal
government to grant workers freedom of association in the 1848 constitution. It was not
until the 1870s that national political pressure groups emerged. The first of these groups
was the Swiss Association of Trade and Industry, followed a decade later by the Swiss
Federation of Trade Unions. White-collar organizations did not arise until the
Association of Trade and Industry and Central Federation of Swiss Employers’
Organizations were formed in 1918. The year was significant, for in 1918 Switzerland
experienced its first (and only) general strike, the Landesstreik.
Because of guild restrictions within towns, new industries spread to Eastern
Switzerland. In 1875, for instance, only 10 percent of the population lived in towns with
more than 10,000 inhabitants. The shift to urbanization led to a decline in agricultural
productivity, attributable mostly to the drastically lower number of full-time farmers.
While a doubling of the population between 1800 and 1900 coupled with increased
mechanization in farming served to offset losses in agricultural productivity, the number
of farmers in this period declined from 65 percent of the population (1800) to 30 percent
(1900). Another means of offsetting alpine depopulation was the employment of
specialists that aimed at increasing the efficiency and profitability of Swiss agriculture
using technological innovations like crop rotation and the utilization of fertilizers.
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Mechanization in agriculture allowed for an increase in productivity despite a decline in
the number of farmers. 41 A restructuring of the Swiss economy away from agriculture
occurred slowly. The result of the slow changes to the economy was the unique Swiss
phenomenon of the “half-bourgeois,” or the “farming factory worker.” 42
Economic restructuring allowed for the number of workers and the value of
production to increase while the proportion of people engaged in full-time agriculture
declined. Workers increasingly found employment in factory-type situations and less in
traditional cottage industries as the nineteenth century unfolded. A second important
aspect of Swiss industrialization was the high level of concentration. In this sense,
concentration referred to the consolidation of many small enterprises into fewer, but
much larger units. Concentration occurred most dramatically within the banking and
chemical industries.
In his study of watch making, the economic historian David Landes points out
that prior to the First World War, Switzerland produced more than 50 percent of the
world’s watches. 43 Although Switzerland’s population in 1913 totaled a miniscule one
percent of the world’s total, it exported three percent of all European goods and held
approximately 10 to 20 percent of its fixed capital abroad. Proportionately, in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Switzerland ranked among Europe’s most
industrialized countries. 44 As early as 1815, Swiss bankers accumulated huge capital
surpluses that were invested heavily abroad. The Swiss labor force adapted quickly to
light manufacturing. The growing importance of Swiss financial and banking services,
41
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the highly specialized and export-dependent economy, and the role of neutrality within
the rapidly emerging international community contributed to Swiss prosperity in the
twentieth century. The combination of foreign trade and neutrality policies enabled
Switzerland to overcome the global depression of the 1930s and thus prepare itself to
survive the Second World War. Central to Switzerland’s legalistic defense of its
neutrality were the rights and duties of neutrals outlined in the 1907 Hague Conventions.
The 1907 Hague Conventions and the Rights and Duties of Neutrals
In the early years of the twentieth century, Switzerland sought legal protections to
ensure the survival of its neutrality policy. The Swiss gained such assurances through the
multilateral treaties that produced the Fifth and Thirteenth Hague Conventions of 18
October 1907. While Switzerland’s proletarian unrest proved less violent than in other
countries, Swiss workers clashed with employers over dangerous factory conditions, the
dominance of industrial cartels, and the right of labor to organize. Job insecurity,
poverty, and short life expectancy characterized the life of the average Swiss worker. In
sharp contrast, Swiss employers benefited from weak labor protection laws, the
prevalence of cartels, and generally low wages for both skilled and unskilled workers.
Given the high level of internal strife inside Switzerland, the leaders of the country
believed neutrality would best maintain national unity. These conventions upheld the
classical form of neutrality that Switzerland practiced. The European powers and the
United States emphasized two duties of neutrals in wartime: (1) the duty of abstention,
and (2) the duty of prevention.
The signatories of the Hague Conventions separated the rights of neutral states
from the rights of private firms or individuals. While no general restriction covered
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economic neutrality, the signatories agreed that neutral states must uphold their right to
impartiality. Private interests within a neutral state may conduct trade with belligerents
but the government may not. Trade between private firms from a neutral country and a
government of a belligerent state must adhere to specific limitations on volumes and
values of goods or services. Both the neutral and the belligerent must agree upon pre-set
limits, referred to as courant normal levels. These levels typically follow pre-war
patterns. In the Second World War, for example, courant normal meant trade volumes
could not exceed 1938 levels. The intention was to prevent wartime profiteering and
unfair trade relationships that favored one belligerent faction over another. 45
Article 1 of the Fifth Convention reinforced the traditional obligations of neutrals.
It stated, “The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.” For Switzerland, its primary
obligation as a neutral state was thus to ensure its territorial integrity and sovereignty at
all costs. Article 2 stipulated that belligerents could transport neither troops nor war
material across neutral territory. Article 6 outlined limitations on the responsibility of a
neutral state: “A neutral power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on
behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of
anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet.” In other words, it remained the
responsibility of a belligerent to abide by international law, while a neutral government
could not engage in trade with any warring camp. Finally, Article 9 required neutrals to
conduct its relations with belligerents in an impartial, unbiased manner. The Thirteenth
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Hague Convention sought similar requirements for neutrals and belligerents in case of
naval war, but the Convention’s signatories never agreed on its ratification. 46
Changing Perceptions of Neutrality and Diverging Worldviews
For most of the nineteenth century, neutrality was a normal element of the
Concert of Europe while military alliances were not. Neutrality had been merely one
means of conducting foreign policy, and it lacked any negative connotations. Following
the First World War this no longer held true. As the international community, led by
President Woodrow Wilson, sought a system of collective security, neutrals suffered
stigmatization. Collective security required the participation of the international
community to impose military and economic sanctions against nations that violated the
principles of Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Switzerland, bound by its impartial foreign
policy could not impose such punishments without expressly violating its duties as a
neutral. Because of this incompatibility with the dominant tenet of international
relations, critics in the United States and elsewhere came to view neutrality as a “residual
category,” not a legitimate foreign policy line. 47 Harsher condemnations of neutrality
often viewed it as a “manifestation of national selfishness.” 48 A common criticism of
Swiss neutrality in the First World War was that averting military responsibilities “was to
shrink from taking part in what the participants-amounting to a high proportion of the
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inhabitants of the globe- regarded as a crusade.” 49 The scope of total war drastically
altered perceptions of both war itself and of neutrality.
Total war shattered the classical view of neutrality. Before the First World War,
neutrality depended on armed conflicts being clearly distinguished from peacetime, on
foreign policy being separated from economic relations, and on military action being
separable from non-military behavior. 50 The First World War blurred these distinctions
and demonstrated an increased correlation between security policy and economic policy.
From its own domestic problems, Switzerland learned that ensuring full employment and
sustained economic growth were essential ingredients to uphold domestic order.
Swiss Neutrality versus International Collective Security
Switzerland hoped to hold a peace conference in Geneva during 1918, but the
unstable domestic situation that stemmed from massive unemployment and economic
stagnation meant that such an opportunity was unrealistic. The Landesstreik of 1918 led
to a referendum on proportional representation which the Swiss electorate approved by a
margin of nearly 150,000 votes and an overwhelming cantonal majority of 19.5 to 2.5.
To lessen further the radicalization of workers, the federal government implemented
gradually a social security system and greater protections to ensure the sanctity of
contracts with employers. 51 In the political elections of 1919, the radical/democratic
leadership faced a formidable challenge from socialists and farmers. The huge losses by
the Liberal Democrats and the correspondingly large increases won by the Social
Democrats demonstrated a greater politicization of marginalized segments of the Swiss
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population. 52 The new political elite sought to inject Swiss foreign policy with a greater
degree of openness in order to combat the “perceived isolation” of the Confederation
from the rest of Europe. 53 Social Democrats opposed Switzerland’s League membership,
however, making those who favored Swiss accession work harder to achieve their goal of
economic integration with the international community.
Although countries like Britain condemned Switzerland for remaining neutral, the
country managed to secure recognition of its foreign policy from the victorious powers.
Under Article 435 of the 1919 Versailles Treaty, the victors reaffirmed the legal right of
Switzerland to practice neutrality, stating that its foreign policy line remained in the best
interests of European peace and stability. Troubling to the Swiss, however, was that their
integral, or complete neutrality, meant they were ineligible to join the new League of
Nations. With the backing of President Wilson, the Swiss managed to have the League
headquartered in Geneva. Despite efforts at accommodating the League, traditional
Swiss neutrality and collective security remained incompatible concepts. To prevent the
economic, intellectual, and moral isolation of the Swiss Confederation, a drastic
modification of traditional neutrality proved urgent.
The Federal Council addressed the delegates at the Paris Peace Conference on 8
February 1919 regarding this incompatibility between neutrality and League membership.
The Swiss sought to gain support for their centuries-old foreign policy:
At the moment when the representatives of the Powers . . .
are about to build the foundations of a new international
organization, the Swiss Federal Council desires to recall the
origin and character of Swiss neutrality. It considers it
politic to affirm the necessity of this secular institution, and
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to point out the part it may be called upon to play in the
future. 54
The Covenant of the League precluded Switzerland from joining the organization due to
the country’s policy of neutrality. Fearing isolation, the Federal Council sanctioned a
commission of experts headed by Max Huber to find a way to force compatibility
between neutrality and participation in the League. To Federal Council President
Giuseppe Motta the League represented “an instrument of international collaboration, of
conciliation among nations and of peaceful settlement of disputes.” 55 Among the Swiss
public, however, League membership proved a divisive issue.
In the debate over League membership, internal divisions between linguistic,
cultural, religious, and political groups reemerged. These problems were especially acute
given the rapid social and economic changes of the postwar period and the clash between
statism and federalism that preoccupied domestic policy debates. Foreign pressures
exposed the division of opinion within Switzerland. Most alarming of these pressures
was the drastic shift in perceptions of neutrality by the international community. The
declining respect for neutrality had been evident during the war. Most directly affecting
Switzerland was the British blockade that blatantly disregarded neutral rights during
wartime as codified by the 1907 Hague Conventions. Equally outraged was another
neutral, the United States. “The belligerents’ nonobservance of rules of international law
brought with it,” according to Luzius Wildhaber, “a correspondingly elastic interpretation
of those rules on the part of the neutrals.” 56 To Switzerland’s detriment, its own
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flexibility toward neutrality and the later renunciation of neutrality by the United States
would drastically compromise Swiss negotiating power.
The Swiss “Special Case”
Perhaps the most striking example of an elastic interpretation of the rules of
neutrals was Switzerland’s decision, reached through popular referendum, to adopt a
form of partial neutrality that was compatible with the principles of the League. To
overcome the restriction outlined in Article 20 of the Covenant -- “the members of the
League severally agree that this covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or
understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof . . .” -- Switzerland
adopted the practice of so-called “differential neutrality.” 57 Because the League required
its member states to participate in collective economic and military action, Switzerland
had to alter the characteristics of its policy of neutrality. Integral neutrality forbade
Switzerland from becoming involved in any type of sanctions. To join the League, a
special solution had to be developed.
Differential neutrality allowed Switzerland to participate in economic sanctions
against violators of the Covenant of the League while abstaining from any direct military
or political action. Article 21 of the League’s charter was amended on 13 February 1920
to include language that viewed Swiss neutrality as an “international engagement for
securing the maintenance of peace.” 58 The Council of the League declared, “The
perpetual neutrality of Switzerland and the inviolability of its territory, as they are
acquired in public international law, by the treaties and by the act of 1815, are justified by
the interests of general peace and are therefore compatible with the Charter of the League
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of Nations.” 59 The unique position of Switzerland within international affairs thus was
once again recognized.
Switzerland was the only potential League member to submit the question of
accession to the public. Robert C. Brooks followed closely the contentious referendum
debate within Switzerland. He observed, “To partisans and opponents of the League
alike the principle of neutrality, consecrated by the history and embedded in the
constitution of Switzerland itself, was the central point of the whole controversy.” 60
Opposed to the League were the Army and the Social Democratic Party. In favor of the
League were the Federal Council and the majority of the Swiss press. Federal Council
President Motta and finance minister Edward Schulthess appealed to voters on 7 May
1920:
. . . a decision of the people against the League would bring
with it irreparable damage to the prosperity of Switzerland,
to the unity of the country, and to the respect which it
enjoys abroad. It would involve the gravest danger to our
commerce, our industry, and our agriculture . . . . The
League of Nations aims at the protection of labor; it assures
just consideration to the mutual commerce and intercourse
of its members; it promotes the development of
international law. It opens the way to gradual disarmament
and seeks to settle controversies arising between nations by
judicial arbitration and peaceful mediation. Above
everything else it will hinder or make difficult the
beginning of armed conflicts. Switzerland cannot refuse
her cooperation when humanity undertakes a broadly
devised plan to bring justice and peace to the world. 61
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Concerns Regarding the Policy of Differential Neutrality
The proposed experiment with differential neutrality required a fundamental
reorientation of Swiss foreign policy. Political and military neutrality remained
unchanged. The approach toward economic neutrality, however, underwent profound
transformation. Traditional integral neutrality implied strict adherence to all three
components to ensure consistency of the policy. Differential neutrality, in comparison,
allowed for a large measure of latitude in the realm of economics. The debate
surrounding League membership focused on fears that differential neutrality would
jeopardize Swiss sovereignty in future wars. Opponents of the referendum worried that
Switzerland’s need to participate in economic sanctions against violators of Covenant
principles would translate to a total disregard for neutrality policy. In response to these
fears the Federal Council argued “entry into the League of Nations in no way diminishes
our independence; on the contrary, it strengthens it.” Furthermore, the Federal Council
stated, “It involves no denial of our traditional neutral policy of peace; rather it will
permit us to pursue that policy in broader ways.” 62 With 77.5 percent turnout, the 16
May 1920 referendum returned a victory for proponents of League membership with a
popular vote of 414,870 in favor to 322,937 opposed. For a referendum to pass, however,
it needed the approval of the cantons. The cantonal vote was even narrower. Had 94
people decided differently in the canton of Appenzall Ausserhoden, Switzerland would
have not joined the League. 63
The experiment with differential neutrality served to obscure the definition of
Switzerland’s state maxim to a greater degree. By following a more flexible foreign
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policy, the Swiss demonstrated a willingness to compromise the integrity of neutrality to
gain economic advantages from League membership. Many scholars view the adoption
of differential neutrality as having been inevitable, arguing that such a modification
showed the dynamism, flexibility, and strength of Switzerland’s state maxim. J.R de
Salis, the World-War-Two radio correspondent and historian, supports this view of Swiss
adaptability. He argues that differential neutrality was critical for the export-and-tradereliant Switzerland:
Because economic dependence on other countries always
has been a determining factor in our foreign relations . . .
there is nothing else for us to do except to accommodate
ourselves to the world as it happens to be . . . . We have to
export in order to meet the needs of domestic consumers.
Our integration into Europe and the world is a fact . . . our
relations are universal . . . . Both the principle of neutrality
and trade interests required, and today still require, a
foreign policy with an international, universal orientation,
open in all directions. To a large extent, Swiss foreign
policy is foreign trade policy. 64
The economic historian Paul Erdman agrees with Salis. In a study of SwissAmerican bilateral relations, Erdman asserts that a “nation’s economic dependency upon
the world economy varies in an inverse proportion to its size. 65 Echoing Salis, he
emphasizes that Switzerland “must accept the fact that its survival is largely dependent
upon developments in the world at large, upon forces over which it has no decisive
influence; that its prosperity depends upon the successful operation of an international
division of labor.” 66 Despite the need for Switzerland to adapt economically, the
experiment with differential neutrality and the League produced severe repercussions for
the small country in the years of the Depression and the Second World War.
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The Failure of the League of Nations
Swiss membership in the League proved contentious from the outset. While
Switzerland agreed in spirit with the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war, it refused
to support arms limitations due to the needs of Swiss armed neutrality. At the 1932
Geneva Disarmament Conference, Federal Council President Motta pushed for a ban on
aerial bombardment. He argued before the plenary council, “Our people have renounced
armed conflicts with foreign countries if it is not in our own defense.” 67 Disputes
between Motta and the Soviet Union-- particularly concerning weapons proliferation,
political repression, and economic cooperation-- escalated to the point where the Swiss
delegation tried to block Russian membership in 1934. Represented on the plenary
council, but not the security council, Switzerland generally avoided overtly political
issues. 68
The impotence of the League became clear during the Italian-Ethiopian crisis of
1935-36. Given the need for Switzerland to pursue relations based on impartiality and
universality, it imposed economic sanctions on both Italy and Ethiopia. Yet these dual
sanctions undermined the very essence of such a punishment, as it failed to distinguish
between the offending nation, Italy, and the victim, Ethiopia. Such collective action also
demonstrated the weakness of Switzerland’s attempt to join traditional neutrality and
international security. Motta’s widely known affection for Mussolini joined with the fact
that economic sanctions really only hurt Italy lessened the enthusiasm of the Swiss
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president for the League. 69 On 22 December 1937, based in part on Motta’s reluctance to
harm Italy, the Federal Councilor announced to parliament that Switzerland would end its
experiment with neutralité différentielle.
In the Memorandum on the Neutrality of Switzerland within the League of
Nations (29 April 1938), the Confederation publicly reverted to integral neutrality, with
its political, military, and economic components. The memo explained why Switzerland
was to withdraw from the ineffective system of collective security. The Federal Council
stated:
Swiss neutrality has a specific character which
distinguishes it from any other neutrality. It is one of the
essential conditions of the internal peace, of the union, and
hence of the independence of a nation composed of
elements which differ in language and culture . . . . The
maintenance of this centuries-old institution is as precious
for Europe as for Switzerland itself. It is neutrality which
has held together for centuries peoples of different race,
language, and religion. 70
The Spanish Civil War, the Italian-Ethiopian crisis, and the Austrian Anschluss
led the Swiss public to realize that the League lacked any power to protect the small
neutral. In March 1938, the Federal Council argued before the plenary council that
Germany should be prevented from annexing Switzerland, as it was in the best interest of
Europe that it remained independent and neutral. The German annexation of Austria
represented to Motta a “reprehensible crime against international law.” 71 Pushed by the
United States, Motta appealed to Czech President Eduard Beneš and Adolf Hitler to
resolve peacefully their dispute, but the Swiss refused direct mediation as it represented a
69
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political conflict. The passive nature of this neutrality served as an indication that
Switzerland needed a more active foreign policy in the case of another general European
war. The withdrawal from the League of Mussolini’s Imperio and Hitler’s Reich led to
Switzerland’s April 1938 return to its traditional, integral form of neutrality. Partly
stemming from domestic opposition to the League as an undue burden, Switzerland
renounced participation in economic sanctions.
Through its practice of differential neutrality, League members saw Switzerland
as hoping to exploit the protections and benefits of both international integration and
neutrality. Credibility and consistency, the hallmarks of a strong policy of neutrality,
were disregarded in favor of short-term gain. Switzerland would suffer as a result in the
immediate future. The Federal Council’s decision to revert to integral neutrality was
based upon the fact that “To remain credible,” Swiss foreign policy required “constancy
and duration and could not oscillate according to circumstances, opportunism, or the
unpredictable dance of the alliances.” 72
In a 14 May 1938 resolution, the Council of the League agreed to the Swiss
“special case,” allowing them to remain as members despite their reneging on obligations
to participate in economic sanctions. The Council declared:
The League of Nations, taking into consideration the
unique position of Switzerland which derives from her
perpetual neutrality . . . accepts and acknowledges the
intention proclaimed by Switzerland that, on the basis of
her perpetual neutrality, she will henceforth cease to
participate in the implementation of sanctions, as regulated
by the Covenant, and declares she will not be required to do
so. 73
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Reverting to integral neutrality seemed to the Federal Council the best solution to its
League dilemma, yet in the years leading up to World War Two, the inconsistent Swiss
foreign policy allowed the future belligerents to take advantage of the neutral in the realm
of trade negotiations.
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CHAPTER 2: THE ECONOMIC WAR BEGINS

The Second World War tested Switzerland’s ability to remain free and neutral.
To preserve their existence, the Swiss relied upon economic, diplomatic, and military
dimensions of neutrality policy. Switzerland needed to demonstrate to Axis and Allied
belligerents alike that its national defense preparations remained within the framework of
neutrality law. The doctrine of Swiss armed neutrality asserted that offensive arms
contributed to a destabilization of the international order while defensive arms
contributed to the maintenance of peace. The maxim “peace through strength” summed
up Swiss defense preparations. 1 Such a maxim clashed head-on with the Wilsonian
doctrine of collective security.
For Switzerland, the ideas of collective security and an international community
threatened its time-tested policy of perpetual neutrality. Three new realities undermined
the chances of remaining neutral: (1) that the fundamental nature of warfare had changed;
(2) that neutrality law, traditionally the main source of strength for neutrality, applied less
and less to wars of the twentieth century; (3) that the shift to a system of collective
security drastically undermined Swiss policies rooted in the outmoded balance of power
system.
The Changing Nature of Warfare and the Impact on Swiss Neutrality
The classical view of neutrality relied on the recognition of neutrals as valuable
components of the delicate European power balance. Under the nineteenth-century
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balance of power system, war was normal and rational while conflicts remained short and
narrow in scope. The post-World War One international system of collective security,
according to Jürg Martin Gabriel, “vacillated regularly between extreme polarization on
the one hand and attempts at multilateral pacification on the other.” 2 At first, for
example, the League of Nations sought to ostracize and punish a vanquished Germany.
Then, realizing the dangers that stemmed from a vindictive Nazi regime, the League
aimed at drawing Germany closer into the fold of the international community.
The instability of the international system in part stemmed from the new reality
that wars became wider in scope and longer in duration. Changing perceptions of armed
conflicts now meant hostile military actions were immoral and unjustifiable. Yet
Switzerland based its policies on the fact that war was inevitable and that bilateralism
was the best course for conducting economic and diplomatic relations. By contrast, the
United States began to view war as preventable through wider, multilateral cooperation. 3
Neither the United States nor Switzerland could deny, however, that economic factors
increasingly shaped the outcomes of armed conflicts.
One country that led the shift toward economic warfare was Great Britain. In his
discussion of British economic warfare and blockade measures, Donald C. Watt pinpoints
the factors that led to this clash of worldviews between great powers and small neutrals.
He argues that the more willing British policymakers came to accept the phenomena of
economic warfare, total war, and ideological conflict, “the more their perceptions of
‘neutrality’ came to be influenced by the geopolitical, strategic, economic, and
ideological relations between each neutral state and the enemy coalition.” Watt notes that
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none of these new dimensions of warfare paid much attention to classical neutrality
rights. 4
Switzerland and the Importance of Defense and Dissuasion
To contend with a new international reality that cared little for Swiss rights and
duties as a neutral, the policy-makers within the Confederation constructed a multi-tiered
defense policy anchored in the state maxim of neutrality. At the root of this policy was
the attempt to show a potential invader the value of an intact Swiss economy and transit
infrastructure. Switzerland’s mercenary tradition meant a strong emphasis on the army as
an instrument of ensuring sovereignty and independence. This policy aimed to show that
“services rendered by Swiss neutrality toward other countries outweigh[ed] the possible
benefits of an invasion of Switzerland.” 5 Along with services like good offices and
diplomatic mediation, British Ambassador David Kelly observed in 1939 that Swiss
efforts to rig its infrastructure and factories with explosives meant the small alpine
country would be difficult to occupy. He reported to London that the Swiss Army’s
commander-in-chief, General Henri Guisan, gave him “assurance that if one German
soldier set foot on Swiss soil, he would ‘press the button’ and the mines in the tunnels
would go off.” 6
The army provided Switzerland with valuable weapons of dissuasion to bolster
the argument that an invasion of the country presented an unacceptably “high admission
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price” that offset any desire to challenge Swiss neutrality. 7 By serving as an instrument
of peace, the army ensured that an invader would face: (1) loss of men and material; (2)
loss of time and the distinct possibility of third party intervention; (3) loss of the benefits
reaped from Switzerland’s highly specialized precision industries, (4) loss of men and
material due to stiff national resistance; (5) loss of international credibility for violating
the sanctity of Swiss neutrality.
In addition to the protection afforded by the armed neutrality of Switzerland, it is
possible to identify seven methods of maintaining the independence and territorial
integrity of the small neutral state. First, as a permanent neutral, Switzerland promised
never to engage in pre-emptive military attacks. Second, the armed neutrality of
Switzerland indirectly supported the defense efforts of its immediate neighbors,
especially Germany and France. Third, Switzerland pledged non-participation in wars or
defense alliances.
Fourth, Switzerland offered its services as a protecting power and intermediary
through its good offices and other institutions. Fifth, the natural alpine fortifications of
the Swiss landscape provided for a national redoubt that counteracted weaknesses within
the country’s general defense plans. Sixth, non-violation of Swiss neutrality meant
economic incentives for supportive belligerents. Seventh, through its asylum policy and
its humanitarian organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross,
Switzerland could offer valuable help in minimizing the depredations of total war.
Contending with Economic Difficulties
The lasting effects of the 1918 Landesstreik saw Switzerland experience high
unemployment levels through 1938. Unemployment peaked in 1936 with 5 percent of
7
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the population, or 93,000 people, out of work. 8 A lack of internal import and export
controls led to foreign meddling is Swiss economic affairs. The failures of the
government and military to stockpile advance reserves had heightened Swiss
susceptibility to belligerent demands in the First World War, and this continued into the
interwar period. Switzerland’s deficiency of industrial raw materials, its lack of arable
land, and its heavily trade-reliant economic structure produced constant problems both in
peace and in wartime. Policy-makers therefore sought to construct a war economy that
could insulate the small state from these difficulties.
The overwhelming reliance on foreign trade forced a reorientation in Swiss
foreign policy. Unpredictable business-cycle fluctuations led to the Swiss withdrawal
from participation in international economic flows during the volatile 1930s. The sharp
drop in its import trade volumes and values resulted from the American adoption of
protectionist policies. Once the American government decided to employ trade diverting
and suppressing mechanisms, demand for Swiss luxury and precision goods disappeared.
Without a dependable market for these goods, Switzerland encountered serious liquidity
issues. By 1936, for example, Swiss exports to the US suffered a 77 percent drop while
US imports declined by 71 percent. 9
Swiss trading practices with larger economies, especially Germany and the United
States, centered on the principle that import volumes correlated with changes in income.
Due to the negative balance of payments that resulted from Switzerland’s dependency on
its export sector, the volume and value of received imports violently changed with the
international business cycle, causing unusually high-income elasticity of imports.
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Problems resulting from the British dropping of the gold standard in 1931 spurred fears
from small European economies that the dominance of American and German influence
over international trade flows presented tremendous concerns for currency convertibility
and the securing of dollars with which to conduct foreign trade.
Thanks to the high convertibility of the Swiss franc with other foreign currencies,
the small neutral avoided the issue of the “dollar gap” that plagued other European
economies. The dollar gap referred to the situation that arose in the 1930s whereby many
European nations experienced a shortage of freely convertible currencies. This lack of
available foreign currencies hurt their abilities to conduct international trade with the
United States. In large economies, producers avoided slumps in certain sectors by
finding substitute domestic markets for goods. In micro-economies such as in
Switzerland, this prospect was impossible. Switzerland, more so than any other nation,
depended on its service sector to ensure positive balance of payments. Switzerland’s
service sector included tourism, insurance, and transportation. A positive balance
indicates a nation exports more goods than it does import, but Switzerland battled a
chronic and costly gap between import expenditures and export proceeds. The gap
widened as war raged outside Switzerland’s borders. Current account deficits increased
from Sfr. 993 million (1932) to Sfr. 1.5 billion (1947). Luckily for Switzerland, service
sector proceeds provided a means to equalize this potentially crippling concern. 10 In
1947, for example, income from the service sector, especially returns on foreign
investments, negated entirely the huge deficits of the visible sector. Despite the
recessionary effects of war on the Swiss industrial sector, manufactured goods,
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weaponry, and other precision products enabled Switzerland to maintain a manageable
trade balance, particularly with its primary trading partner, Germany.
The Modification of Swiss Economic Strategies and the Shift to Bilateralism
Switzerland’s economic standing depended on the revision of fiscal and currency
policies to contend with the changing international situation. In the post-depression
years, Switzerland increasingly balanced its current accounts via bilateral clearing and
payment agreements. Reacting against America’s imposition of excessively high trade
barriers through the Smoot-Hawley tariff legislation, the Federal Council adopted a trade
diverting policy to contend with US protectionist measures. American economic
uncertainty contributed to a curtailment of money spent on Swiss luxury and precision
goods. To cope with the loss of US and British revenues, Switzerland implemented a
retaliatory trade diverting policy, referred to as the Stützungspolitik. The aim of this
“inverted system” was to keep Swiss domestic prices artificially high in order to shift
demand away from the export market to favor importers.
To offset the flow of cheap imports, the Federal Economic Department employed
quantitative import controls and foreign exchange regulations through bilateral trade
agreements with foreign nations. According to the Swiss economist Hans Schaffner,
Swiss quantitative import regulations “mainly served as a defense against restrictive
measures applied to the Swiss export trade by foreign governments. 11 At the same time
Switzerland implemented the Stützungspolitik, the Federal Council expressed outrage at
what it saw as an unjustified decision by the US to devalue the dollar during 1933 to deal
with similar British actions taken in 1931. As a second component of its trade diversion
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scheme, the Federal Council decided to engage in competitive devaluation of the Swiss
franc. Switzerland aimed to allow more flight capital to enter the country by lowering the
exchange rate of the franc. Throughout its long history, Switzerland usually favored free
trade over protectionism. The global depression stunted the growth of Switzerland’s
micro economy. In response, the Swiss adopted measures to insulate themselves from
the volatility of currency fluctuations and unpredictable business cycles.
American quantitative export controls and foreign exchange restrictions led the
Swiss to reject multilateral trade negotiations in favor of a bilateral framework for such
talks. The rationale behind this shift was that Swiss trade negotiators would fare better in
one-on-one situations as opposed to dealing with many large countries at once. In a
bilateral situation, the Swiss felt they could exercise more influence. Such logic was
inherently flawed. The Confederation’s decision to base its balancing of payments
operations on clearing credits, compensation agreements, and quota limitations would
compromise the negotiating position of Swiss commercial delegates in the numerous
bilateral trade agreements that dictated economic relationships in the coming war.
Switzerland lacked the foresight to realize the negative aspects of bilateral trade
agreements, fixating on its loathing of tariffs as an economic stabilizer.
Switzerland’s survival depended on its “use [of] the newest and best weapons of
economic warfare.” 12 Swiss economists and policy-makers realized quickly that issues
of economics would dictate its ability to survive another world war. These new
economic policy tools had begun to be incorporated during the early 1930s to maintain
equilibrium in Switzerland’s trade balances. The use of clearing credits and payment
agreements insulated the financial sector from the volatile nature of international gold
12
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and capital movements. While such trade suppression and diversion tactics proved
effective in the short-term, the vulnerabilities of the Swiss market to international events
soon showed that these methods of fiscal and monetary management were poorly suited
for Swiss wartime needs.
Switzerland Decides to Alter Its Capital Flight Behavior
Beginning in the late depression years of the 1930s, Swiss investors and policymakers feared that political instability would affect the global economy in a negative
way. Thus, the Swiss began a historic shift in their capital movement practices, favoring
the stability of the US domestic market. Traditionally, concerns of profit motivated the
capital flight behavior of Swiss investors. A gentleman’s agreement between the Swiss
National Bank (SNB) and larger private banks, like Credit Suisse, sought to keep capital
flowing into Switzerland. The worsening international situation “erode[d] Switzerland’s
significance as an investment destination” and created anxiety in both investors and
political leaders. 13
With the coming of the Second World War seen by Swiss investors as an
unavoidable consequence of Nazi aggression, they withdrew their assets and relocated
them to sit dormant in US accounts for the purpose of safety, not profit. In the short
term, this move toward protecting capital investments from economic volatility produced
favorable results. In the long term, these dormant Swiss funds held in the US provided
the Allies with a powerful tool of manipulation in negotiations with Switzerland. Due to
the small size of Switzerland’s economy, its export-orientation, and the highly
specialized nature of its industries, short-term volatility could potentially paralyze the
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nation. The additional pressures of total war and the difficult transition from a peacetime
to a wartime economy produced an exceedingly complex and unstable situation for
Switzerland. Swiss investors and economists decided that shifting funds into idle US
accounts represented their best option, as few alternatives existed. Had investors left
their assets in German accounts, for instance, these funds would have been seized by
Allied officials and used to rebuild Europe. Although the frozen assets of Swiss nationals
held in US accounts led to a great deal of blackmail during the war, once Switzerland
resolved its disagreements with the Allies, the majority of Swiss flight capital returned to
the rightful owners.
Domestic Policy, Emergency Powers, and the War Economy
Despite the obvious increase in military contracts, Swiss consumer industries
suffered greatly as they proved unable to compensate for the drop in demand for civilian
goods. Swiss economic policies in World War Two stressed the need for full
employment, control of foreign trade, and an active defense of its rights as a neutral.
Switzerland linked its fate to both the German and American economies’ abilities to
weather the coming war. Switzerland needed these markets to survive, as its policies
were “dictated by economic necessity,” while those of Germany and America were
shaped by “political expediency.” 14
The Swiss economy proved especially vulnerable because of the huge levels of its
foreign investment. In 1939, for example, Swiss foreign capital investments reached 17
billion Swiss francs (Sfr.). Comparing this figure to the national income of Sfr. 9 billion
demonstrates the importance of Swiss foreign investment practices. Examining figures
from 1941, Switzerland ranked third in the world, behind Canada and Britain
14
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respectively, for investments in the United States Swiss investors poured $1,210.6
million into the US, representing 14.9 percent of European total investments and 9.5
percent of the world total. The next biggest investor, Canada, shifted $1,709.2 million
into US accounts. Canada thus contributed 13.4 percent of the world total. The single
largest investor in the US economy, Great Britain, relocated $3,238.9 million into US
accounts that totaled 39.4 percent of European totals and a staggering 25.4 percent of the
global level. 15 Switzerland “had to fulfill its task as a financial transit point as a mission
of its neutrality and a condition of its economic survival.” 16
Trade division head Jean Hotz saw the control of foreign trade as the “essential
precondition for conducting the war economy.” 17 The Swiss historian Jakob Tanner
describes the wartime economy as relying on a “traditional structure” despite the aim of
breaking with failures of the past. 18 Successful operation of such an economy depended
on sustained economic growth, accessible capital assets, and high quality, specialized
goods for export. Through centralized control, the Federal Council claimed it could
prevent foreign interference in Swiss economic affairs while maintaining full
employment.
In late 1937, the Federal Council appointed a delegation to organize the war
economy. Preparations for military readiness took an unacceptably long time due to an
unwillingness of Social Democrats to inject funds into the Army. That year, the Social
Democrats altered their views concerning defense preparations, thus allowing parliament
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to approve a Sfr. 235 million armaments credit. 19 Appeals to Swiss nationalism produced
two tangible results. First, in the efforts to achieve consensus, Switzerland experienced a
marked shift towards political centrism. For example, the Social Democrats had
previously refused to support any increase in military spending. With the push to achieve
political consensus, the Social Democrats changed their position. By the end of the
1930s, they too advocated higher levels of defense spending. Second, a degree of
industrial cooperation between managers and workers produced so-called peace
agreements in the metal, watch making, and engineering industries. Negotiations now
would be the basis for change with both employers and employees renouncing the use of
force. What prevailed were attitudes of moderation to ensure sustained economic
growth. 20
To construct an efficient and centralized war economy, the Federal Council freed
itself of the constraints imposed by the Swiss constitution and the practice of direct
democracy. The Vollmachtenbeschluss, or Emergency Plenary Powers Act, of 30 August
1939, suspended civil liberties and the instruments of Swiss direct democracy. With civil
liberties curtailed and the right to referenda revoked, the actions of Swiss parliament and
the Federal Council swiftly eliminated popular political participation along with any
potential opposition from the legislative or judicial branches of the federal government.
The only means of exercising the power of the legislative branch was through the seldom
held and entirely symbolic Vollmachtenkommissionen, or Parliamentary Committees
Granting Emergency Plenary Powers.
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The Federal Council was henceforth empowered to take “all measures necessary
to maintain Switzerland’s security, independence, and neutrality.” 21 Free from the
restraints of the constitution and political accountability, the wartime Vollmachtenregime
signified a break with democratic and liberal tradition at a time when totalitarian
ideologies imperiled Europe. Emergency powers produced the opposite of their intended
effect. Instead of increasing the power of the Federal Council, emergency powers
actually lessened its ability to cope with the pressures of war. Without a parliamentary
buffer, the influence of special interest groups greatly increased. For some Federal
Councilors, such a development was desirable, but for others, it signaled a dangerous
primacy of economic interests over all else.
Higher levels of government expenditure met with greater demands imposed on
the Swiss citizenry at a time when civil liberties ceased to exist. In readying the country
for war, all males fell subject to compulsory military service in the long-standing
tradition of the Swiss militia, while the government imposed mandatory crop cultivation
in an effort to reduce dependence on food imports. The military remained subordinate to
the Federal Council, but at the local and cantonal levels, it assumed precedence over the
judiciary and the police. The only foreseeable alternative to the suspension of civil
liberties by the federal government would have been similar actions taken by the army,
likely resulting in a military dictatorship.
Problems Concerning Transportation
Greater emphasis on the regulatory role of the state led to price controls, salary
assessment commissions, and rationing measures. The export of strategic goods,
including ammunition, explosives and detonators as well as aviation equipment, military
21
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chemicals, and communication equipment required Federal Council approval per an 8
July 1938 decree. Switzerland realized the need for an organized and efficient system of
transportation, but transit policy remained a central concern throughout the war.
Transportation problems exemplified the interface between security, foreign policy, and
economics. The War Transport Office focused especially on the Gotthard and
Lötschberg-Simplon railways that were of particular military interest to the Axis powers.
These rail links would soon supply the German Afrika Korps with goods. With Italy’s
entrance into the war, they served to circumvent the British blockade.
Before the war, approximately 2.5 million tons of goods passed through
Switzerland annually en route to Germany, France, and other European regions. Once
the war began, the importance of the north-south railways became clear as volumes
increased to nearly 6 million tons per year. 22 The Swiss railway workers’ union assured
both the Swiss government and foreign nations that no troops or war goods would pass
through Switzerland in accordance with the Fifth Hague Convention of 1907. Being a
landlocked country in the heart of Europe did not stop the Swiss from creating a complex
system of sea transportation. The Wartime Economy Office looked for states likely to
remain neutral during the war to utilize their shipping fleets for Swiss import and export
needs. The Scandinavian neutrals, Norway and Sweden, refused to allow Switzerland
access to their fleets. Greece, however, allowed Switzerland to borrow fifteen freighters.
Italy’s invasion of Greece complicated matters for Switzerland.
With Greek defeat imminent, Switzerland bought ships from Greece and other
nations, creating a Swiss high seas fleet. By 1 January 1943 due to mining and aerial
bombardment, direct shipping to the ports of Marseilles and Genoa was no longer safe.
22
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Switzerland then had to look elsewhere for a solution to its transportation nightmare.
Transport by air and land offset the loss of direct sea shipping. Difficulties and dangers
associated with both land and air transport, however, produced a crisis in Switzerland by
1941. Even if trade representatives succeeded in procuring necessary food and raw
materials, no safe means of getting those goods into Switzerland existed.
The Structure of Switzerland’s War Economy
As Jean Hotz stated, trade policy proved central to Switzerland’s economic
survival. That Swiss industries all profited handsomely from the Second World War is a
common misconception. While it is true that between 1938 and 1941, Swiss business
earnings increased 5 percent, and that the agricultural sector experienced profit increases
of nearly 40 percent, by 1942, all sectors encountered economic recession. Overall,
farmers earned the most while commercial ventures fared worst. In 1941, the
commercial sector made less money than in 1938; by 1944, this segment of the economy
earned 10 percent less than it did in 1938. 23 Due to the stagnating productivity of
Switzerland’s commercial and agricultural sectors, efficient organization of the economy
proved imperative to the country’s efforts to survive the war with its institutions intact.
The federal government, through the Central Office for Wartime Economy imposed
regulations and constructed the organizational framework while para-governmental
groups were responsible for details and policy implementation.
The Central Office for Wartime Economy staffed six divisions with experts and
civil servants. The most important of these was the Division of Commerce that oversaw
bilateral trade negotiations with the Axis and Allied governments. The Price-Control
Authority sought to prevent runaway inflation and excessive increases in the cost of
23
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consumer goods. Despite rationing measures, price controls, and the freezing of rents to
equalize purchasing power among the Swiss public, consumer prices climbed ever
higher. The consumer price index, set at 100 in 1939, grew to a dangerous 146 by 1942.
This index increased to 152 between 1942 and 1945. 24 Until 1942, both import and
export volumes increased by 50 percent over 1939 levels, but prices climbed nearly 110
percent, and the cost of living more than doubled. The Price-Control Authority did little
to reverse a decline in wages and salaries, as incomes could not match the rise in prices.
Swiss gross national product (GNP) declined 15 percent by 1941 from the pre-war real
level of Sfr. 4,376 per capita. 25
Three other divisions, the Agriculture Office, the Wartime Nutrition Office, and
the Wartime Welfare Division all aimed at combating rising prices and the declining
standard of living with varied degrees of success. The Wartime Industry and
Employment Office, with subsections for raw materials and the branches of Swiss
production had more luck than the agricultural, welfare, and nutritional offices. A mixed
management scheme that combined private-sector specialists and federal civil servants
succeeded in coordinating military and civilian interests to maintain morale levels. The
structure of this office mimicked the militia structure of the Army. Although a shift
towards corporatism arose from the needs of the war economy, the mixed management
structure did allow specialists to play a role in decision-making that streamlined the
bloated Swiss bureaucracy and offset the pro-business attitudes of the Federal Council.
On 2 September 1939, the war economy authorities began taking swift measures
to organize Swiss industry and agriculture. A Federal Council decree of 22 September
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gave priority for all raw materials and war-related items to the Swiss Army. An effort to
prevent foreign meddling in Swiss trade policy was made in October by creating the
Central Office for Foreign Trade, a subordinate of the Division of Commerce. The
Central Office for Foreign Trade played a pivotal role in monitoring private Swiss firms.
The Federal Council forbade Swiss companies from submitting to foreign export
controls. Corporatism and the tremendous power of the business and policy elites
integrated the import, utilization, and export of goods “into a complete mechanism of
supervision.” 26 As the war unfolded, however, it was clear that these steps were
insufficient.
The War Begins
The joint Anglo-French declaration of war against Nazi Germany on 3 September
1939 signaled the construction of Britain’s maritime blockade. Speaking four days later,
the Swiss Army’s commander-in-chief, General Henri Guisan, announced to the Federal
Council, “On Sunday, 3 September 1939, when at 12:10 Central European Time, Great
Britain declared war on Germany, our entire army had been in its operational positions
for ten minutes.” 27 The readiness of the Army to defend Switzerland did act as a
deterrent, but if the country was to survive the war unscathed, other measures of
economic preparedness proved necessary. What follows is an account of Swiss efforts to
maintain trade impartiality, neutrality, and ultimately, independence. The events of
World War Two are divided into four distinct phases. Covered in this chapter are the
first two phases. The first phase lasted from the outbreak of war in September 1939
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through the defeat of France in June 1940. On the morning that the Wehrmacht’s swept
through Poland, the Federal Council formally decreed:
The international tension, which has motivated the Swiss
Confederation to take military measures, obliges it to
declare its unshakable will not to depart in any way from
the principles of neutrality which for centuries inspired its
policy and to which the Swiss people are profoundly
attached.
The Swiss Confederation pledged to “maintain and defend by every means at its
disposal” its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and neutrality. 28 Its obligations as a neutral
meant Switzerland was to maintain equal trade volumes with each belligerent, but the
necessities of survival and restrictive trade policies on the behalf of both blocs made such
universality impossible. Due to its close ties with the German economy and the disparity
between the relative military positions of the Axis and Allied armies, Switzerland could
not keep the same trade levels, but attempted to keep the values to both belligerents
comparable. Initially, the Swiss expressed a false sense of hope in the military
capabilities of the Allies. Soon, however, widespread fears of an Axis invasion would
devastate Swiss morale.
During 1939, Switzerland conducted a balanced export trade with both belligerent
blocs that slightly favored the Allies. To the Axis, Switzerland provided Sfr 272 million
in goods, with Germany receiving Sfr. 191.5 million of that total. To the Allies, Swiss
industries exported goods worth Sfr. 305 million. Britain benefited from Sfr. 164.5
million while France received Sfr. 140.1 million. In comparison to exports, the level of
imports lacked a similar balance, as the Axis eclipsed the volumes and values that the
Allies delivered. The Axis provided Switzerland with Sfr. 576 million in goods, the bulk
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of which came from Germany. From the Allies, Switzerland received Sfr. 384.6 million
in food, coal, and other vital goods. 29 Switzerland’s right to import and export strategic
war goods proved a contentious issue throughout the war.
Between April 1939 and March 1940, the average value of weapons delivered to
the Allies reached Sfr. 264 million while the Axis received a significantly lower amount
of Sfr. 150,000. Although this disproportionate situation violated Switzerland’s
responsibility to conduct trade based on impartiality, a main reason for the Allies’ receipt
of such an overwhelming amount of Swiss weaponry was Germany’s desire to remain
self-sufficient in terms of its rearmament. Britain’s Industrial Intelligence Centre
conveyed a second reason in 1939: “As a neutral in wartime, [Switzerland] would remain
an invaluable source, which could be considerably expanded, of machinery and
components for armament production.” 30
France Succumbs to Defeat While Switzerland Prepares for the Worst
The defeat of France and the construction of Germany’s counter-blockade caused
a marked shift in Swiss trade relations. Between 1939 and 1941, exports to the Axis
increased three-fold to Sfr. 577 million per year; goods to Italy doubled in value to Sfr.
185.6 million per year. Imports from the Axis also increased in value. In those same
years, goods from Germany nearly tripled to Sfr. 656.2 million. Italian imports more
than tripled to Sfr. 244.5 million per annum. In comparison, goods to and from the Allies
declined considerably. After the defeat of France, Switzerland exported goods worth Sfr.
91.4 million to France and Sfr. 23 million on average to Britain between 1939 and 1941.
Likewise, Switzerland received drastically lowered amounts of goods from the Allies.
29
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From France, the Swiss gained Sfr. 72.1 million worth of goods. British imports to
Switzerland declined by a third to Sfr. 68 million. 31
The lack of equilibrium between the belligerents like those during the First World
War and the export dependency of its economy meant the return of blockade restrictions
held potentially devastating consequences for Switzerland. The naval historians David L.
Gordon and Royden Dangerfield identify offensive and defensive dimensions to the
economic war. The offensively oriented policies of the belligerents engaged the
defensive posture of “self-consciously” neutral Switzerland. 32 The offensive British
blockade and competing German counter-blockade incorporated the manipulation of
neutrals as instruments of their respective foreign policies.
Gordon and Dangerfield describe the role of neutrals as providing “loopholes” to
circumvent enemy blockade restrictions. 33 One such loophole was the Swiss GenevaAnnemasse Railway “gap” which allowed Swiss companies to smuggle goods through
France into Britain. This “gap” continued to operate after the defeat of France. In the
months following the German victory over France, the Wehrmacht lacked the troop
strength to monitor the flow of goods passing between Geneva and Annemasse. Another
such loophole was the complex process of circumventing German export restrictions by
diverting trade to South America, into the United States, then back into Britain and
France. Switzerland demonstrated an ideological alignment with the Allies by
temporarily ignoring Axis blockade restrictions, but once Germany discovered the nature
of these smuggling operations, Switzerland had to show the Nazi regime its willingness
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to cooperate. The German ambassador cabled to Berlin in 1940 “That in disregard to
permit procedures, great quantities of goods subject to permits were exported from
Switzerland to enemy countries and the US without the required transit permits.” 34
Between July and August 1940, the military situation perceptibly shifted to favor the
Axis. Pressure from the German government caused Switzerland to close the railway
“gap.”
Swiss Economic Alignment and the Issue of Strategic Exports
To gain concessions from Germany, Switzerland showed the Axis preferential
treatment by temporarily aligning with the counter-blockade. Such alignment clearly
violated of the Fifth Hague Convention’s principle of parity in neutral trade. On 6
August 1940, trade delegate Hotz struggled to prevent the total blockading of Swiss
exports. He argued to German ambassador Köcher, “As the establishment of the system
of escort documents will take some time and as the Swiss-French border can not yet be
monitored, the Swiss are prepared for the time being not to issue any export permits for
goods subject to escort documents.” 35 The willingness of Swiss trade negotiators to grant
the Nazi government preferential treatment indicated a decline in the power of the Allies.
As Gordon and Dangerfield aver, “One of the major problems of economic warfare [for
Switzerland] was to reconcile the conditions and methods of total war with traditional
concepts of neutral rights.” 36

34

Klaus Urner, ‘Let’s Swallow Switzerland:’ Hitler’s Plans against the Swiss Confederation.
Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 111.
35
Ibid., 85.
36
Royden and Dangerfield, The Hidden Weapon, 3.

60

Based on an “anti-balance of power formula,” Swiss policy-makers aligned with
the stronger belligerent as determined by military developments. 37 It remained critical
nonetheless to keep foreign trade policy as universally oriented as conditions allowed.
One method of ensuring impartiality was the ban issued by the Federal Council
preventing private Swiss firms from exporting war materiel to belligerents despite their
right to do so under the umbrella protections of the 1907 Hague Conventions. The
Federal Council’s Ordinance on the Treatment of Neutrality (14 April 1939) prohibited
private firms from exporting any weaponry or weapons-related goods to belligerents. In
its decision to impose the ban, the Federal Council aimed to bolster the damaged
credibility of the policy of neutrality. “This self-restriction,” in the view of Swiss legal
scholar Dietrich Schindler, was “motivated by neutrality law” so as to demonstrate a
“morally indisputable neutrality policy.” 38
The Federal Council, urged by trade experts and economists, reversed the ban
soon after its imposition. By changing its mind, the Federal Council clearly
acknowledged the critical role played by Swiss weapons and munitions firms in the
national struggle to remain sovereign and neutral. Political scientist Efraim Karsh sees
reversing the ban on strategic exports as demonstrating a “willingness to risk a certain
erosion in the image of [Swiss] neutrality in order to further what they considered vital
economic interests.” 39 The Federal Council ended the restrictions on 8 September 1939.
It was far better to uphold full employment, according to Marcel Pilet-Golaz, than
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“dogmatically stick to a system.” 40 Marcel Pilet-Golaz, foreign affairs minister and soon
president of the Federal Council, admitted the “moral position of the country would be
bolstered by keeping up” the ban. He argued the continuation of such a restricted foreign
trade stance would come “at the price of very serious economic and financial difficulties,
which would serve as a social de-stabilizer.” 41
Former Federal Councilor Georges-André Chevallaz argues that the Swiss
government’s decision to resume weapons trading was a critical element of Switzerland’s
resistance to invasion threats and demands for economic alignment.
To wear a mantle of virtuous neutrality and complete
pacifism while refusing all weapons trade would have led
to nothing more than economic strangulation,
unemployment, stagnation, and in the short term, the
invasion of a country unable to defend itself, its absorption
by the Axis bloc, and the take-over of its industries. 42
In the decision to rescind the export ban, the Federal Council aligned behind the
importance of the “national interest” (Staatsräson) over the concerns of the “national
morality” (Staatsmoral). 43 Returning to a more open trade policy proved both a positive
and negative development for the Swiss. On the positive end, such trade enabled the war
economy to function by securing needed industrial raw materials and food. By protecting
the national economic interests, the federal government was best able to defend Swiss
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and neutrality. Full employment contributed to social
stability and acted as a defense against subversive political ideologies. By engaging in
active trade with the belligerents, Switzerland benefited from a rapid development of new
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and traditional industries, the access to new technologies and production efficiency
techniques, and complimented expansion of the financial sector.
On the negative end of the spectrum, the encouragement of strategic exports sales
to belligerents consumed urgently needed raw materials for the Swiss domestic market.
Such an emphasis on weapons trading resulted in a stunting of certain non-military
sectors and contributed to the war efforts of both belligerent camps. More times than not
Swiss elites favored profit over principle.44 For Gabriel, the policy-making elite,
“traditionally a tiny group of people intimately tied to the business community, has at
times used neutrality in a self-serving manner that did not always serve the best interests
of the country.” 45
The First War Trade Agreement Talks
Switzerland confronted economic warfare on an unprecedented scale during the
Second World War. In preparing its position towards trade with the belligerents,
Switzerland faced pressures from blockades and counter-blockades, asset freezing
measures, and outright economic coercion. The requirements of impartiality in trade
relations trapped Switzerland in a vicious cycle. If the Swiss agreed to concessions for
one bloc, the other side would impose countermeasures. Concessions to one side always
brought punishments from the other. Thus, the anti-balance of power formula provided
Switzerland with a guideline. Willingness to compromise on the part of the belligerents
changed depending on the dynamic of military power. Military setbacks, such as those
experienced by Britain after France succumbed to defeat allowed Switzerland to gain
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valuable concessions, while the strength of the Axis military machine during the same
period led to overt manipulation of Swiss weaknesses as an export-reliant neutral state.
The approaches of the belligerent powers toward the Swiss constantly shifted
according to the perceived utility that Switzerland’s industries could provide for the
respective war efforts of the Axis and Allies. While geo-strategic considerations often
brought the threat of invasion to Switzerland, issues of economic warfare dictated
belligerent policies towards neutrals. Britain’s reliance on economic warfare measures
like blockading and blacklisting, according to Roderick Ogley, “gave her a powerful
weapon with which to dictate to neutrals how much trade they should do with Germany.”
Ogley continues, “…but every curtailment in Germany’s share of a neutral’s trade gave
Germany that much greater incentive to attack and occupy it. Britain was aware of this,
and usually moderated her demands accordingly.” 46
Switzerland’s strategy for preserving its neutrality depended greatly on the
respective policies of the belligerents. In conducting its war trade talks with the
belligerents, Switzerland aimed to minimize “temptations and give each potential attacker
the greatest possible incentive to respect its neutrality.” 47 Marc Perrenoud, an expert on
the history of Swiss banking, argues the Allies “had greater means at their disposal to
exert financial pressure [on Switzerland] than did the Axis.” 48 In the first phase of the
war, Allied diplomacy focused on expanding its Swiss contracts. Their interests centered
on ensuring access to Swiss goods more so than reducing Swiss exports to Germany.
Overall, the economic war proved more important to the Allies, while the receipt of
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Swiss credit clearances was the Nazi regime’s primary goal. Both blocs nevertheless
acted similarly through their indirect attacks on their enemy by way of attacking neutral
Switzerland.
Britain’s Reliance on Swiss Strategic Exports
Increasingly apparent was that the belligerents on each side drastically altered
their views of Swiss neutrality. As the war progressed, the belligerents conceived
neutrality more so as an instrument of their own foreign policies, in terms of the practical
applications such a policy offered to their war efforts. The interwar experiment with
differential neutrality that distanced the policy from rigid legalistic terms continued to
threaten the power of Swiss trade negotiators in their dealings with the belligerents.
Certain Swiss goods proved essential to the early British war effort. For example,
by using the limited and valuable Swiss franc reserves to purchase dyes and paints from
chemical companies in Basel, Switzerland discovered how important such goods were to
Britain. To Britain’s dismay, the raw materials for those goods came directly from
Germany. Prior to American entry, and because of poor British structuring of their war
economy, the Allies relied on Swiss exports in products like jewel bearings, diamonddies, watches, and theolodites. Outstanding Oerlikon anti-aircraft gun orders became
“absolutely vital” to the Admiralty after the March 1941 Dunkirk losses. The Admiralty
conveyed to the Swiss government that it was willing to pay “almost any price” for the
weaponry. Of the total requested 20,000, the Admiralty had yet to receive even 100. 49
Ambassador Kelly threatened Switzerland “that the deliveries would at least be made
according to the minimum program of orders and, if that were not the case, Great Britain
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would consider it an unfriendly act.” 50 Paul Erdman interprets such threats by Britain as
an indication of the weakness of Switzerland’s negotiating position. “Due to
Switzerland’s slight economic and political weight,” Erdman argues, “this country must
accept the developments in the world as independent variables; this country’s trade policy
is therefore basically defensive in nature.” 51
Concurrent talks with the Allied and Axis governments began in November 1939
and lasted until April 1940. Matters took a turn for the worse in Switzerland when the
British returned to its export certification and licensing regime. Dubbed the “navicert”
(naval certification) or “commercial passport” system, the British Ministry for Economic
Warfare (MEW) constructed an elaborate means of monitoring neutral trade.52 The
MEW granted navicerts to neutral states promising not to re-export war materiel. The
system first operated on a voluntary basis. Private firms within neutral countries who
violated the re-export requirements faced punishments like placement on the British
Statutory Lists, or blacklists.
The economic ramifications of full military mobilization became too grave for the
Swiss to bear. In December, the Federal Council pleaded with General Guisan to demobilize gradually militia troops with industrial skills. British ambassador David Kelly
conveyed his general outlook on Swiss policies in January 1940. He wrote to the English
historian E.H. Carr:
The Swiss appear to be (and their survival is probably due
to) a hard-headed and practical race, who are not
desperately interested in the rights and wrongs of a war
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which they detest . . . . [T]he majority of them have long
ago calculated that while a Nazi victory would not at all
suit their interests, it is up to them to keep as much trade
going in all directions as they can get away with. 53
Kelly pointed to the goal of Swiss commercial negotiators: universally oriented and
unrestrained trade relations. Past preferences for Allied weapons contracts hurt the Swiss
in their negotiations with the increasingly powerful Nazi war machine. As the Axis came
closer to achieving hegemonic control over Europe, the German coal embargo of March
1940 indicated to Switzerland that drastic change was imminent. After six months of
stalemated negotiations between Switzerland and Britain and France, the Allies secured
the first trade agreements with the neutral state on 25 April 1940.
The constant negotiations between November 1939 and April 1940 saw the Allies
argue that previous trade agreements with Switzerland were invalidated by the notion of
clausula rebus sic stantibus, or that the contracts were only valid if the situation stayed
the same. In declaring pre-war trade agreements invalid, the Allies demanded that
Switzerland pledge not to re-export goods. The Federal Council responded to this by
arguing it was an illegal interpretation of public international law. The British War Trade
Agreement and the parallel French Accord du Blocus established parameters for future
negotiations.
Despite France’s comparatively weaker negotiating position than Germany’s, in
the first phase of the economic war, Swiss weapons and precision goods
disproportionately ended up in French hands. The British and French concerned
themselves with ensuring their outstanding Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns received priority
from the Swiss weapons manufacturer. The British MEW concerned itself more with
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trade objectives than economic warfare during the period before the war trade agreement.
As the war changed, so too did this priority. In this early period, the British government
viewed Switzerland as an “entirely respectable client” and the “only decent neutral in the
world.” 54 The Allies imposed limits on exports, restricted the conditions for re-exports,
and demanded priority in obtaining Swiss armaments and munitions. In return,
Switzerland received an empty promise that neither Britain nor France would meddle in
the Swiss domestic economy. Switzerland also received a weak assurance that the Allies
would abide by the Fifth Hague Convention and allow trade with Nazi Germany to
continue.
The April 1940 War Trade Agreement included four conditions. First, the
agreement imposed a ban on pure transit of imported, finished goods. Switzerland could
not transport imported goods in their original state. Switzerland could re-export
processed goods to Germany, but could not do so with unprocessed goods. Second, the
British drew up a detailed list of banned exports. The extensive list included goods
Switzerland never would have exported. France, more so than Britain, allowed
Switzerland to engage in multilateral trade by lowering obstructions to trade with
Germany. Third, export quota lists established courant normal volumes set at 1938
levels. These quota lists formed the foundation for the navicert system in terms of
regulations concerning the origin of goods and the percentage of enemy content included
in items intended for export. Fourth, the Allied governments allowed Switzerland to
trade goods that were absent from the lists without restriction. The Swiss, however,
usually ignored this condition, since such trade potentially could disrupt trade balances.
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Immediately apparent was the emptiness of the Allied promise that Switzerland
could monitor its own trade relations. The creation of the Allied Commission Mixte
Permanente constituted a flagrant disregard for neutrality law as it limited the freedom of
Swiss trade monitors by having them answer to Allied representatives posted inside
Switzerland. An upside to this measure of heightened inter-Allied cooperation was the
ending of a complex system of dual licensing requirements for food and materials. A
downside was an intensification of British economic warfare against the Swiss. Although
British officials acknowledged that Swiss trade with Germany was a matter of national
survival, they aimed to supply Switzerland with the absolute minimum of commodities
and food, intending to prevent hoarding and stockpiling of these resources.
The Federal Department of Economics would henceforth be required to issue a
Certificate de Garantie, which promised that goods for export abided by Allied trade
regulations. 55 To Switzerland’s dismay, these restrictions were far from the only
problems it faced. The defeat of France, for instance, led to an escalation of
transportation problems. Before June 1940, Switzerland utilized its high seas fleet to
deliver goods to the ports of Marseilles and Genoa, which then traveled overland into
Switzerland. After France fell, such a transit route no longer presented itself as safe.
Switzerland sought to bring goods solely by overland truck routes, but confronted
logistical and financial nightmares that intensified its reliance on Germany.
The mining of Norwegian territorial waters by Britain and the invasions of
Scandinavian countries by Germany caused a rise in suspicions regarding economic
warfare objectives intended for Switzerland. British strategies for dealing with neutrals
had changed at the end of the Phony War period. Relatively amicable Anglo-Swiss
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relations now deteriorated as Britain intended Switzerland to share in the hardships of
war. As an example of this shift, Winston Churchill warned from the Admiralty, “Small
nations must not tie our hands when we are fighting for their rights and freedoms.” 56 The
future prime minister, in a 30 March 1940 BBC radio broadcast, repeated his warning.
Churchill asserted, “There can be no justice if in a mortal struggle the aggressor tramples
down every sentiment of humanity, and those who resist him remain entangled in the
tatters of violated legal conventions.” 57 The tone of Churchill’s warning demonstrated to
Switzerland that British regard for neutrality rights had all but disappeared. A complete
embargo of Switzerland, lasting from 14 through 18 June 1940, intended to force Swiss
alignment with the Allies and reverse Germany’s progress toward achieving European
hegemony. The growing impatience towards neutrals actually helped Swiss interests in
London, however, as the declining respect for neutrals like Norway served to strengthen
the Swiss “special case.”
Once the Axis launched “Operation Yellow” on 10 May 1940, the deterioration of
Anglo-Swiss relations quickened. Under this plan, Germany would penetrate France and
indirectly force Britain into signing an armistice favorable to the Axis. 58 Compared to
the flexible and adaptive Blitzkrieg tactics of the Wehrmacht, French divisions were
immobile. Other French problems included low morale within the High Command,
popular opposition to more military spending, and over-reliance on the Maginot Line
defenses. The combined British, Belgian, and French forces proved ill-matched and illprepared for the confrontation with Germany. A sense of relief swept over Switzerland
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when the Wehrmacht by-passed Switzerland and the Maginot Line in favor of sending
armored tank divisions through the Belgian Ardennes Forest. The relief subsided
quickly, as the Swiss knew they were not yet safe.
Difficult Trade Negotiations with the Axis
Capitalizing on the British and US withdrawals from a pre-war clearing
agreement with Germany, the three largest Swiss banks, on 18 September 1939, in
cooperation with the Swiss Banking Association (SBA), entered into trade and financial
negotiations with Germany similar to those begun with the Allies. From these talks came
the first wartime trade agreement between Switzerland and Germany. The pattern set
forth in these talks “formed an irrevocable basis” for future Swiss-German bilateral
relations. 59

The conditions of the agreement demonstrated the effects of increased

“global economic complexity” and the great difficulties faced by Swiss policy-makers in
attempting to mesh the conditions of total war with the requirements of neutrality.60
Despite the hostility of the Swiss press and the attacks it provoked from Nazi
officials, the Reich did issue a statement that pledged its support for Swiss neutrality,
without the preconditions the French and British guarantees first required of the Swiss.
Following the signing of the first Swiss-German trade agreement, the Nazi regime stated
its views:
The German government is of the view that economic
neutrality implies the continuation of normal merchandise
and transit trade . . . . [I]t is prepared in principle to
maintain exports and trade with neutral states. It expects
that they, in principle, will act the same way with Germany.
It follows that Germany will make no objection if these
states continue their normal trade, even with countries at
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war with the Reich. The German government assures the
neutral states that it does not consider this activity to be
incompatible with neutrality. 61
The bankruptcy of this pledge became clear almost immediately, not just for Germany,
but also for the other belligerents. By June 1940, Switzerland faced demands by the Axis
to end completely its trade relations with Britain as the military situation worsened for the
Allies.
With no symmetrical situation, Switzerland had trouble upholding the appearance
of partiality and universality in its foreign trade policy. The Allies lacked the power to
suppress trade with Germany with the exception of cutting off overseas markets and
supplies through the British naval blockade. In comparison, Germany possessed the
ability to cut off trade with neutrals and the occupied nations. Switzerland relied on a
two-front strategy for dealing with Germany. First, the Swiss offered generous clearing
credits, steadily increasing the debt ceiling of Germany. While these excessive credits
did violate neutrality, without them, Germany undoubtedly would have invaded
Switzerland. Second, Switzerland relied on the need of Germany to supply Italy, and
vice versa, through its north-south transit tunnels. With every credit extension, Germany
promised more coal and raw materials. Yet Germany used the pretext of the SwissAllied trade agreement to extract further concessions from Switzerland. The Deutsche
Nachrichten Büro, for example, stated in mid-1940 that Switzerland violated its
neutrality if it “would permit other countries to force them into actual restrictions or
formal controls against the continuance of normal exchange and transit of goods from
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neutral states to Germany.” 62 The article mentioned nothing about Germany doing the
same thing exactly to Switzerland.
The Changing Military Dynamic and President Pilet-Golaz’s Infamous Speech
After June 1940, Switzerland faced the harsh reality of encirclement by fascist
regimes. Jean Hotz described the fragile position of Swiss trade negotiators following the
defeat of France. Hotz recalled his experiences in this period of transition:
While there were comprehensive contractual rules
governing war-related trade which applied to the Axis
powers from 1940 (adapting to changing conditions, but
admittedly also repeatedly disregarded in the absence of
any reality), economic relations with the Allies during the
whole period when our country was surrounded by the Axis
were in a state of permanent crisis. 63
The British historian Neville Wylie offers a similar perspective. He asserts, following the
fall of France, “what little was left of Switzerland’s economic freedom was slowly
whittled away through a combination of German and Italian pressure, French
pusillanimity, and British parsimony.” 64 The German “pressure” led to constant credit
concessions by Swiss banks while the “parsimony” of Britain prevented Swiss industries
from receiving raw materials and the population its food. For example, British
willingness to participate in smuggling operations declined as German counter-blockade
efforts intensified. Because Britain confronted shortages of convertible foreign
currencies, it became less able and less willing, to purchase precision goods from
Switzerland. As Britain reduced its trade with Switzerland, the neutral country lost a
vital source of foodstuffs. Thus, Switzerland turned to Germany in order to compensate
for the decline in food imports. After June 1940, weapons and related goods surged to
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Sfr. 623 million to Germany, Sfr. 148.2 million to Italy, while all other nations’ (Allied
and otherwise) export receipts totaled Sfr. 190 million.
In a radio address delivered 25 June 1940, Federal Council President Marcel
Pilet-Golaz conveyed a defeatist outlook that warned the public to brace itself for a new
German-led world order. He claimed that greater willingness to collaborate with Nazi
Germany would serve to lessen Nazi demands of Switzerland in the long-term. The tone
of the speech exemplified the fears of German victory that came to dominate the
decisions of the Swiss policy elites. President Pilet-Golaz’s speech remains fiercely
debated by historians. What follows is an excerpt, as the speech serves as a good
indicator of the weaknesses of the wartime Federal Council. Pilet-Golaz began:
France has just concluded a truce with Germany and Italy
. . . . It is for the Swiss a matter of great relief to know that
our three great neighbors are on the road to peace . . . .
This appeasement- is that not the word?- is natural and
human, especially for the modest neutrals who have been
spared up to now in every respect . . . .
Europe must find a new equilibrium, so different than from
before, which will understandably be grounded on other
foundations than those which the League of Nations was
unable to establish, despite its vain efforts . . . .
Everywhere, in all fields, spiritual and material, economic
and political, an indispensable realignment will need
strenuous efforts that will have to be applied beyond
outdated formulas if they are able to have any effect. This
cannot be done without giving up a good deal and without
painful sacrifices . . . .
There is no doubt we will have to give up many
conveniences and commodities we hold to because they are
unconscious manifestations of our egotism . . . .
The speech continued, as Pilet-Golaz called for the blind obedience and
unquestioning support for its policies that were described as ensuring work for the
population and preparing for national defense. He finished by asserting that Swiss
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economic survival served as the basis for all of the Federal Council’s decisions and
actions: “individual, regional, and partisan differences will disappear in the melting pot
of national interest, the supreme law.” 65 Robert Kohli, head of the wartime Political
Department and member of the Permanent Delegation for Negotiations of the Federal
Council, summarized the outlook of Pilet-Golaz by simply stating the obvious: He
observed that Germany was “very close to us, and Britain . . . very far away.” 66
Impressions of the speech continue to polarize Swiss historiography and block
possible consensus on the period of the Second World War. The orthodox view,
established by Edgar Bonjour in the 1960s, interprets the speech in a wholly negative
light. Bonjour’s writings embody the view that wartime Switzerland was merely a
“victim of developments in world politics.” 67 In his multi-volume official history of
Swiss neutrality, Bonjour consistently attacks Pilet-Golaz and the authoritarian
tendencies of the wartime Federal Council. While Bonjour feels that economic ties with
the Third Reich were acceptable morally on the basis that this trade ensured national
survival, he condemns Pilet-Golaz for his defeatism and his desire to appease Germany.
As Bonjour correctly notes, it was possible to trade with Germany without resorting to
appeasement tactics.
A major source of difficulty in understanding the intentions of Pilet-Golaz’s
speech was the often-conflicting statements he made. In a rare full powers committee
meeting held 26 June 1940, Pilet-Golaz maintained that an invasion was highly unlikely.
If so, the ominously defeatist tone of his radio address lacked credibility. To the
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committee he stressed that Swiss “. . . efforts should be directed at avoiding subjection to
any one economic bloc. We need to establish counter-weights to certain economic
pressures that could be brought to bear on us from the north, the south, and the west.” 68
In a July 1940 letter to Swiss minister to Berlin Hans Frölicher, Pilet-Golaz expressed a
desire to align economically with the Axis via the trade negotiation that would be
completed the following month. Pilet-Golaz wrote,
We are pleased to hope that the conclusion of the trade
negotiations currently in progress will give us an
opportunity to indicate our willingness to adapt to the new
situation on the continent, and to collaborate with Germany
in the field of business. Should this create the impression
of a détente-- as we expect it will-- it will be easier to find
ways of German sympathy in other areas without exposing
ourselves to accusations of servility. 69
The Swiss-Nazi Counter-Blockade Agreement
The trade negotiations Pilet-Golaz referred to in his correspondence with
Frölicher yielded the Swiss-Nazi trade agreement of 9 August 1940 and a fundamental
change in the position of Switzerland in relation to the belligerent blocs. Such an effort
to uphold economic neutrality as he stressed in the emergency powers committee meeting
vanished with the conclusion of the agreement, called the Counter-Blockade Agreement
(Gegenblockadeabkommen). 70 Two concentric circles, the British blockade and the new
German counter-blockade, now greatly increased the possibility of economic
strangulation for the Swiss. Under these conditions, Switzerland demonstrated (as it
should have) greater willingness to accommodate the Axis. As the first condition of the
Counter-Blockade Agreement, Germany received a credit clearance of Sfr. 150 million
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while Italy received Sfr. 200 million. In return for this violation of Swiss neutrality
rights, Germany promised the delivery of 170,000 tons of coal, iron, and mineral oils per
annum. 71
The German trade negotiators also freed three-fourths of Switzerland’s exports
from counter-blockade restrictions and set fixed quotas for non-essential Swiss exports,
thus ensuring customers for those goods. Additionally, Germany gained the assurance
that Switzerland would continue to recognize the 1909 Gotthard Treaty that allowed for
access to the north-south transit routes. Regarding the demand that Switzerland
participate directly in the counter-blockade, the Swiss trade delegation vehemently
refused.
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They were able to stall and wait for the military situation to change. In fact,

trade negotiator Robert Kohli felt the policy of Switzerland “will consist of playing for
time.” 73
The Swiss-Axis Supplementary Agreement of July 1941 increased the Nazi debt
ceiling to Sfr. 850 million in exchange for more coal and iron and a lowering of
restrictions concerning exports to non-Axis countries. Because of the Swiss-Axis trade
agreements, Swiss exports to Germany increased from Sfr. 191.5 million in 1939 to Sfr.
284.8 million in 1940. By 1941, this figure had shot upward to a staggering Sfr. 577
million. Imports from Germany stayed more stable, increasing only in the years of Nazi
hegemonic control of Europe, 1941 through 1943. To offset the negative trade balance
with Germany, Switzerland relied on its invisible sector extensively as well as gold
transactions. The Swiss National Bank acted as a reserve bank for the Reichsbank during
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the war, with deposits of gold coins, ingots, and bars totaling approximately Sfr. 1.7
million between 1939 and 1945. 74
The ligue du Gotthard, the Aktion Nationaler Widerstand, and the Volksbund
Gold purchases and credit clearances to the Axis served to heighten Allied
suspicions of Swiss activity. Although it banned all extreme political parties, the Federal
Council still faced a growing number of organizations within Switzerland that desired
political and economic integration with Nazi Germany. At the same time, fierce
resistance to such collaboration reflected the sentiments of the majority of Switzerland’s
population. Most famous of the groups that opposed the authoritarian and pro-business
attitudes of Federal Councilors like Pilet-Golaz was the so-called ligue du Gotthard.
Consisting of 8,000 army officers loyal to General Guisan and his calls for unconditional
resistance, the Gotthard League publicly criticized the steps taken by the government
toward closer collaboration with Nazi Germany.
A second group with the same anti-Nazi agenda was the secretive but influential
Aktion Nationaler Widerstand. The officers that participated in this group felt the best
means of preserving sovereignty was to support Pilet-Golaz’s de-mobilization efforts, but
for a different reason. The Aktion Nationaler Widerstand believed that a large-scale demobilization was compatible with Guisan’s plan for the alpine fortress known as the
Réduit national. The aim was to create a more realistic military defense plan that relied
less on Swiss frontier guards. By focusing on the Réduit, Switzerland hoped to appear
non-aggressive to the Nazi regime. The desire of this group to resist military invasion
meant relegating concerns of economic neutrality to the periphery of its position.
Guisan’s second in command, Colonel Jakob Labhart, supported efforts “to put the Swiss
74

Jung, Credit Suisse Group, 18.

78

economy more at the service of Germany policy.” He also expressed a desire to “fulfill
Germany’s industrial orders, in order to participate this way, in the Axis’ new economic
policy.” 75
Pilet-Golaz’s personal notes convey his concerns at the end of July 1940. He
wrote, “The Reich’s brilliant victory has created German-Italian hegemony on the
continent. It is difficult to see who could break it . . . The economic situation is grave; we
are surrounded and our neighbors control our food supply. Risk of unemployment.” 76 In
July 1940, the Volksbund, an extreme-right organization, demanded publicly that the
Federal Council sever the remaining financial ties with the now lifeless League of
Nations. Pilet-Golaz met with the leadership of the collaborationist group. They urged
him to strengthen both military and economic ties with the Axis and to impose strict
censorship to silence the press. The Volksbund felt victorious due to Swiss participation
in the Nazi-led europäische Zentralclearing system. Switzerland had become a de facto
member of this system following its decision to grant credit clearances to Germany and
Italy. Volksbund leader Wilhelm Frick relayed to Pilet-Golaz the mounting German
impatience with the Swiss press. In a 21 September 1940 letter, Frick urged the Federal
Council to take bold steps to suppress anti-Nazi press statements and adopt a militarily
and economically flexible doctrine of neutrality. Frick saw that adapting to the military
situation as essential.
Another major effort at greater collaboration with Germany came through the socalled “Petition of the Two-Hundred.” The goal of the petition, signed by 173 business
leaders and Volksbundists, was to “harmonize [Switzerland’s] policy with that of the
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Reich” and curtail the Swiss freedom of opinion by censoring the press. They
campaigned against cultural and economic dependency while pushing to achieve a high
level of domestic political consensus. Reminding the Federal Council of its unique role,
the petition called for resistance against foreign ideologies. While less extreme than
other government opposition groups, the Federal Council still refused to acknowledge the
petition.
In a May 1941 report published by army colonel Gustav Däniker, the high-level
officer urged the Swiss foreign policy elites to foster closer ties with Nazi Germany. In
this report, he argued,
If Switzerland is to play a role in the new Europe, if it
desires to be a truly useful member of Europe it will have
to join it. Such collaboration is not anti-Swiss. On the
contrary, in view of our future and our nature, it respects
our traditions. Collaboration with the new Europe does not
contradict the idea of Switzerland; it merely discards some
old and obsolete forms. One can be a good citizen of
Switzerland while thinking in European terms and
committing one’s self to the new Europe. What is
incomprehensible is that we are proud of our stubborn
determination to stay out. 77
Aligning with the views of the Volksbund, Däniker blamed the posture of the press for
elevating German hostility toward Switzerland. Hans Frölicher supported Däniker by
claiming “. . . the overwhelming disproportion of military forces and Switzerland’s strong
dependence on the Axis, especially the German Reich which totally surrounded it, for its
economic prosperity, provisions, survival, and international trade.” 78 The Army High
Command sanctioned Däniker for his intransigent behavior.
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Defending himself from attacks by Swiss foreign affairs minister Pierre Bonna,
the Nazi sympathizer Frölicher softened his assault on the validity of neutrality, claiming
he agreed
. . . that our situation, faced as we are with the two Axis
powers, implies a new direction in our foreign policy . . . .
This new direction is indispensable in economic policy; it
has already had its concrete application . . . . But there is
no question of giving up our traditional neutrality policy
willingly. 79
Instead, he urged the Federal Council to declare it “ready to collaborate in the
reconstruction of Europe” and consciously “set about the functions and tasks which a
politically and economically neutral Switzerland is able to fulfill in the new continental
Europe.” 80 Swiss commercial delegate Heinrich Homberger increasingly worried about
the issue of strategic exports, and especially Axis attacks on Switzerland for upholding its
right to trade with the Allies. Desperately vulnerable to Axis blackmail, Switzerland
granted sweeping economic concessions to Germany and Italy.
No matter how a reader may interpret the desires of the pro- and anticollaboration movements inside Switzerland, it is clear that without some degree of
cooperation with Nazi Germany, democratic Switzerland would have ceased to exist as a
free country. The ramifications of total Nazi hegemony over Europe offered a worse
prospect for the future than did Switzerland’s willingness to trade with the Axis.
Switzerland represented the last bastion of democracy on the European continent. With
Britain powerless, and largely unwilling to provide Switzerland with the materials and
food it needed to survive, the neutral had no choice but to seek help from wherever it
came. The Swiss confronted a genuinely drastic situation and acted to ensure the
79
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independence of a country that posed no threat to either Axis or Allied war efforts. As
the Swiss saw it, the disregard for their rights and the imposition of economic warfare by
both blocs tended to obscure the moral arguments forwarded by the Allies. The Axis
supplied Switzerland with the commodities it needed for national survival, not the Allies.
In the period after the French defeat, Nazi negotiators secured the majority of
Swiss strategic exports. The Germany ability to obtain these weapons and munitions was
limited only by their ability to secure Swiss credits. Soon enough, the Swiss found
themselves thrust into the “Nazi economic orbit” because the Allies denied them
comparable access to Allied goods. 81 Closer economic ties with Germany inevitably
meant further reductions in Swiss trade with the Allies.
Mimicking the British navicert system, Germany enacted its Geleitschein export
restrictions via decree on 1 September 1940. The decree prevented Switzerland from reexporting processed and strategic goods without the newly required certifications.
Germany constructed the Ständige gemischte Kommission, which was analogous to the
Allied Commission Mixte Permanente. The trade monitoring apparatuses of each bloc
functioned almost identically to the oversight commissions of Britain and Germany
during the First World War. Allowing these foreign bodies to operate inside Switzerland
showed that Swiss planners failed to achieve their fundamental objective for the war
economy: remaining in complete control of trade. With the new export licensing system
came the requirement of the Federal Economics Department to grant a Certificate de
Garantie for items to receive an Axis Geleitschein. 82
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British reaction was unduly harsh given the compromised military situation of the
Allies in summer 1940. The Allies demanded Swiss firms to reduce sharply the enemy
content of finished goods from 25 percent to 5 percent for them to be eligible for
navicerts. Encroaching further into Swiss domestic affairs, the Allies imposed the same
condition as the Axis’ Certificate de Garantie through its version, referred to as a
Certificate of Origin and Interest. These new pre-certification restrictions acted to make
the procurement of needed goods even more difficult for Swiss industrial firms. 83
Phase Two
The second phase of economic warfare lasted from the fall of 1940 through the
spring of 1943. Switzerland failed to see the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in July
1941 and the American entry into the war as major turning points. The Swiss did believe
however, that Field Marshall Erwin Rommel’s November 1942 defeat and the battle of
Stalingrad in January 1943 provided clear indications that Nazi hegemony would soon be
broken. More so than in the first phase, Switzerland experienced the physical realities of
total war. With Italy serving as a combat zone during 1943, Switzerland’s southern
border troops feared German invasion and/or an Allied pre-emptive incursion into Swiss
territory. During this phase, the British blockade and the American operations to freeze
Swiss assets shaped relations between the neutral and the Allies. The entry of the United
States meant an intensification of the economic war. While Germany received Swiss
strategic exports valuing Sfr. 122 million and Italy secured Sfr. 61 million in similar
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goods, the Allies received nothing during 1941, mostly because of the massive output of
US industries. 84
US Capital Freezing Operations and Omnibus Accounts
The US Treasury Department froze all continental European assets on 14 June
1941 through Executive Order 8785. By issuing this order, the Treasury Department
reinforced its earlier measures that blocked all European assets taken from Europe and
deposited in US accounts. US officials estimated that the total foreign deposits,
investments, interests and other funds in American accounts equaled $12.7 billion. With
the executive order, $6 billion of that total now fell subject to the blocking restrictions. 85
Through the executive order, the Commerce Department aimed “to prevent the
liquidation in the US of assets looted by duress or conquest” and sought “to prevent the
use of the financial facilities of the US in ways harmful to national defense and other
American interests.” 86
Swiss investors understandably expressed their outrage at this action. Because
Swiss banks and investment firms had opened branches in New York during the 1930s,
before the asset freeze, Swiss clients proved able to conduct transactions in the United
States despite the war. Swiss investments in the US ranked third behind Canada and
Britain. Of the total $12.7 billion in blocked assets, Swiss investors owned $1.2 billion
(Sfr. 5.2 billion), or 9.5 percent of the total and 15 percent of the European total. The
Swiss Federal Political Department mistakenly declared before the asset freeze “blocking
measures against non-combatant or non-occupied European states are not anticipated by
84
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the relevant US agencies.” 87 It was loans and the gold and currency transactions with
Germany that caused this precipitous decline in Swiss-American relations. The freezing
of Swiss assets was but one of many steps taken to curtail trade between the small neutral
and the hegemonic Nazi state.
Due to Swiss banking secrecy laws, another issue arose: that of “omnibus” or
“collective securities” accounts. Omnibus accounts allowed for the transactions of two or
more investors to be combined into an anonymous portfolio. Such an account protected
the identities of the individual account holders because the broker transacted for them in
his name. With the assets of more than one investor combined into a single account, it
proved difficult for American authorities to identify the source and amount of funds held
within a particular omnibus account. Making matters more difficult for the American
Treasury Department, since the brokers and clients were Swiss nationals, these omnibus
accounts benefited from Switzerland’s banking secrecy laws that had been enacted in
1934. American regulators feared that omnibus accounts served to hide Nazi funds
behind the veil of banking secrecy protections.
Omnibus accounts, along with gold and currency transactions, formed the basis
of American criticisms of Swiss wartime economic behavior. 88 The Federal Council
instructed their ambassador in Washington, Karl Bruggmann, to express the profound
anger of the Swiss people regarding the frozen assets to Secretary of State Cordell Hull.
Bruggmann relayed the “deep-rooted mistrust” of the American authorities that stemmed
from Switzerland’s relations with Italy and Germany.
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Bruggmann identified five reasons for this mistrust:
The principal accusations involve the flight of Americanheld Axis assets through Switzerland, the transfer of Axis
assets to Swiss persons, trade in Sperrmarks [blocked
marks], the repatriation of German and Italian dollar bonds,
the purchase of dollar banknotes, etc. It is assumed that
such activity is still being conducted to the extent possible,
even today. 89
To deal with the frozen asset problem and to ensure adequate reserves of US
dollars, the Swiss Banking Association and the Swiss National Bank entered into a
gentlemen’s agreement. The most important element of this agreement was the creation
of two categories for transactions in US dollars: “finance dollars” (Finanzdollaren) and
“export/merchandise dollars” (Warendollaren). Under this system of “managing the
dollar, or Dollarbewirtschaftung, the Swiss National Bank reduced the rates of exchange
between the franc and the dollar. 90 Banks had free access to finance dollars for the
purposes of financing international investments. Merchandise dollars, although heavily
restricted, existed for exported goods, payments for diplomatic services, and insurance
transactions. All transactions utilizing merchandise dollars fell subject to fixed rates of
exchange.
The Swiss Banking Association entered into the gentlemen’s agreement with the
hope that the National Bank would compensate for the frozen assets in the US by making
available to the banks an equivalent amount of Swiss francs within the confederation.
The prediction that dollar credits and debits would be nearly equal proved an erroneous
assumption. What occurred instead was that available dollars for exports exceeded
greatly the demand for US currency to pay for imported goods into Switzerland from the
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dollar area. By the end of the second phase of the war in June 1943, Switzerland’s
blocked currency holdings in the US increased by another Sfr. 161 million while the
small neutral faced a complete embargo by the Allies. It was the freezing of assets by the
US and the strength of the Swiss franc that led to increased gold transactions with the
German Reichsbank.
From the Axis perspective, Germany desired to offset the gains made by Britain
through the Lend-Lease Program. One means of achieving this goal was to threaten
Switzerland into reducing its trade levels with the Allies. Starting in 1941, the Swiss
franc became the most freely convertible, and thus most desirable, currency in Axiscontrolled Europe. Germany benefited from the Allies’ harsh stance toward Switzerland.
Intensely angry over what they deemed illegal freezing of their US assets, Swiss investors
and government officials alike sought recourse in heightened trade with the Axis powers.
The Swiss government reacted to Allied pressure by refusing to subject the foreign
exchange market and capital transactions to restrictive controls and by extending a Sfr.
850 million loan to Germany.
The loan constituted the largest concession Switzerland made up to that point, but
it must be seen as a form of defensive economic warfare. If the Allies refused to assist
Switzerland, it had to seek assistance wherever it became available. The supplementary
loan aroused little public debate inside Switzerland due to the tremendous anger felt
towards the United States and Britain. One exception to the lack of public inquiry
regarding the loan came from the Social Democratic National Councilor Hans Oprecht.
He worried about the long-term consequences of the loan. In a speech to the Nationalrat,
Oprecht asked, “Won’t this ordering of our foreign trade mean that Switzerland is
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economically bound into the ‘new Europe’ against our will, and in such a way that our
absolute and integral neutrality appears to be at risk?” 91 Pilet-Golaz defended the loan to
British ambassador Kelly. He argued, “Even if our [German] credits were never repaid,”
the Federal Council “would rather spend 800,000,000 francs on keeping factories going
than spend it on the dole with the ensuing social and moral disintegration.” 92
Switzerland’s hard-line stance against the Allies soon would change. The defeat
of France marked a clear turning point in the economic war for Switzerland. Prior to
France’s defeat, Switzerland traded extensively with the Allies, with Germany receiving
little from the small neutral. Once Italy joined the war in June 1940, Switzerland faced
no other choice than to increase its trade volumes with the Axis countries. Before Italy
entered the war and Germany occupied France, a relatively symmetrical military situation
presented itself. In the period when Britain effectively stood alone, Swiss weapons and
munitions proved exceedingly important to that country’s efforts to resist Nazi military
aggression. The situation would soon change again.
With the United States becoming a belligerent nation, Britain relied less on Swiss
strategic exports and more so on American contributions. As we will see in the third
chapter, the entry of America into the war also changed the situation in terms of
international respect for neutrality. Henceforth, Switzerland sought much closer trade
ties with Germany as it contended with the Allied war effort that displayed little
sympathy for the plight of the small neutral. Despite the pressures faced by Switzerland,
the period discussed in the following chapter is undeniably one of the most exciting (and
difficult) times that country faced in its seven-hundred-year existence.
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CHAPTER 3: THE SOURING OF SWISS-AMERICAN RELATIONS

After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 and the GermanItalian declaration of war four days earlier, the United States abandoned its neutrality and
joined the Allies. For Switzerland, the loss of its former partner in neutrality meant it
soon would face pressure from the United States to alter its own foreign policy course.
Even before the United States officially renounced its neutral status, programs like LendLease enabled the American government to disregard traditional definitions of neutrality,
especially in terms of foreign trade policy. The United States no longer interpreted
neutrality in the classical manner as it ignored the requirements of impartiality and
universality in terms of trade with belligerents. Furthermore, the United States refused to
acknowledge that neutrals maintained the legal right to trade with Germany.
Declining Respect for Swiss Neutrality
The historian Jürg Martin Gabriel notes that the Lend-Lease program and the
American practice of a “moderate type of internationalism” resulted in a “decline of
classical neutrality.” 1 That is, by interpreting neutrality in their own terms, the US
government threatened the existence of Swiss permanent neutrality. The American State
and Treasury Departments increasingly aimed to ensure that Switzerland shared in the
burdens of total war. With their common link severed, Swiss-American bilateral
relations turned from bad to terrible.
Still worse, for the Swiss, the already ambiguous role of neutrals became even
more uncertain. The international community agreed upon no single definition of
1
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neutrality. Luzius Wildhaber addresses this issue, stating that Switzerland desperately
needed to reassert its policy of neutrality in clear language. The Swiss government
undertook no such effort until the postwar period. In the Second World War, Switzerland
continued to justify its neutrality by seeking recourse in the protections of international
law. Given the ideological component of total war and the fact that Switzerland faced
coercion from all belligerents, a definitive Swiss interpretation of neutral rights and
duties was imperative. Wildhaber argues,
It would seem evident that where the rules of international
law are unclear and ideologically charged, matters of style,
linguistics, and symbolism become all the more important.
The neutral state will be well advised to realize its own
values and to seek its own terminology and symbolism, so
that even stylistically, its non-involvement becomes clear. 2
Competing notions of neutrality inside Switzerland vied for support, thus
eliminating the possibility of a clear definition of the nation’s foreign policy line. The
inability of the major parties to agree upon a unified position concerning Germany
harmed greatly any hope of sustaining political consensus. Supporters of center-right and
right-wing political factions like the Radical Party, the Christian Democratic People’s
Party, and the Swiss People’s Party sought greater economic integration with the Axis.
Those belonging to left-leaning parties such as the Social Democrats, Liberals, and
Democrats desired to distance Switzerland from what they viewed as an ideologically and
morally repugnant Nazi regime. Disgust for Nazi Germany still could not fix the
economic crisis that Switzerland confronted. If the Allies could not provide Switzerland
with the commodities it needed to survive, ideology became a secondary consideration
for trade negotiators. The Allies demanded that Switzerland sever its ties to Germany but
2
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offered no concessions in exchange. Once the United States entered the war, the
perceived utility of Swiss industries declined. At the same time, however, with
Switzerland seemingly less attractive to the belligerents economically, it became less of a
target for invasion. Although Nazi military strategists had drawn up many possible
invasion scenarios with names like “Operation Tennenbaum” and “Case Switzerland,”
these plans never reached fruition. Operation Tennenbaum, for example, never gained
Hitler’s approval because the invasion of the Soviet Union tied up all the military
resources intended for attacking Switzerland. Nevertheless, the Germans continued to
exploit fears of a Wehrmacht attack on Swiss targets. 3
The Central Role of Trade Negotiations
After December 1941, the Swiss increasingly relied on the skill and persistence of
their trade negotiators to resist the excessive demands of the belligerents. Swiss trade
officials shouldered the incredible burden of keeping export and import channels open so
that adequate raw materials and food were available to sustain the war economy. So long
as the Nazi military machine remained intact, trade with Germany was an inescapable
necessity for Switzerland. To compensate for the pressures associated with the blockade
and counter-blockade, Switzerland sought to protect itself through extending credits to
Germany as a form of defensive economic warfare.
In its relations with the United States, however, no such safety net existed.
Switzerland traditionally had relied on the American economy in times of crisis, but
during the Second World War, the Swiss lost access to that market. Allied blacklisting
measures combined with escalating efforts to end gold transactions with Axis countries
3
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forced the Swiss government to take swift action. As a study of Credit Suisse banks in
the Second World War observes, “Rising gold prices and the increased demand for gold
at home and abroad made legal regulation of the Swiss gold trade unavoidable.” 4 The
Federal Council’s decree of 7 December 1942 marked a turning point in the war for
Switzerland. From then on, the free market trade in gold became replaced by a highly
centralized system overseen by the Swiss National Bank.
Three fundamental changes resulted from the Federal Council’s decree. First,
maximum prices for gold sales were determined. One result of these price regulations
was that Swiss banks experienced a decline in foreign gold sales, contributing to smaller
profits. Second, banks wishing to conduct trade in gold became subject to strict
compulsory licensing requirements. Third, all imports and exports of gold now needed
authorization from the Swiss National Bank. An unintended consequence of these
restrictions was an explosion in the volume of illegally exported gold for which exact
figures are impossible to locate.
In anticipation of Allied efforts to oversee the international gold trade, the Federal
Council enhanced greatly its own regulatory role as well. The Allied measures came
through the London Declaration of 5 January 1943 (“Inter-Allied Declaration against
Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories under Enemy Occupation or Control”).
Through this declaration, the Allies refused to recognize as legal any gold transfers to or
from occupied territories, even if such transactions abided by international financial laws.
Allied officials sought to curb “compulsory transfers” within the Third Reich, to restrict
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the trade in “looted assets” from occupied territories, and to limit “hot money” or
“country-hopping capital” that weakened the stability of European capital markets. 5
Under the conditions of the London Declaration, the Allied governments jointly
pledged to reduce transactions in looted assets “against the countries and peoples who
have been so wantonly assaulted and despoiled.” 6 In forceful language, the Allies
explained that American and British officials would now watch the actions of Swiss
bankers and gold brokers closely. The Swiss, according to the declaration, were to end
immediately gold transactions with the Axis governments. Switzerland ignored this
warning. Meeting with Swiss trade negotiators in London, MEW official Dingle M. Foot
insisted that Switzerland reduce the number of specialists working for Germany.
The Allied Embargo of Switzerland
Strengthening the stern warning issued by Foot, the British decided the best
means of ensuring Swiss compliance was through a total economic embargo that began in
April 1943. Justifying the embargo, Anthony Eden insisted that “Switzerland should do
all it can not to prolong the war.” 7 At the same time, the US government expressed its
“profound concern” over the Swiss-Nazi trade relationship. 8 An article in the 23 January
1943 Saturday Evening Post articulated the views of many in the United States. In this
article, the journalist Charles Lanius accused Switzerland of indirectly becoming an Axisoccupied state because of its economic ties with Germany. In response to these criticisms
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of Switzerland, an article written by Walter Lippmann appeared in the New York Herald
Tribune. Lippmann wrote,
What was not so obvious to Mr. Lanius, though it should
have been, is that the Swiss nation which is entirely
surrounded by the Axis armies, beyond reach of any help
from the democracies, cannot live without trading with the
surrounding Axis countries, still is an independent
democracy. The engulfing sea of 125 million hostile
neighbors has not yet engulfed the Swiss. 9
Lippmann accurately gauged the situation faced by Switzerland. Without the
possibility of trade with Allied governments, Switzerland saw no other possibility than
intensified trade with the Axis. If the Allies refused to supply Switzerland with what it
needed to survive the war, then it would look elsewhere. Instead of restricting Swiss
access to Allied economic markets and trade, it seemed to Lippmann that a better course
of action would have been to provide the Swiss with the needed goods and materials to
remove any enticements for trading with the Axis. With Nazi armies surrounding
Switzerland, had the Swiss forged closer ties with the Allies at the price of lessening
contact with Germany, the chance of an Axis invasion certainly would have increased
tremendously.
By June 1943, the Allies demanded the unconditional surrender of Germany. 10 In
September, British MEW officials felt the American policies towards Switzerland were
unduly harsh. Jürg Martin Gabriel encapsulates the Swiss predicament during this period
of isolation from the Allies. He believes that from the outset of the war,
. . . the Americans wanted to put more pressure on the
European neutrals than the British had. In 1942 and 1943,
this was easier said than done, because the military
situation was so unfavorable that the Allies lacked the
9
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necessary leverage. On the contrary, as long as the
Germans completely dominated the Continent, the neutrals
were clear assets. It was perhaps unfortunate that they all
traded with Germany, but this was preferable to having
them, as occupied territories, become fully integrated parts
of the German war economy. In economic warfare, too, it
was better to have a neutral than another enemy. 11
Gabriel alludes to the fact that neutrals like Switzerland remained tempting targets
for German occupation and indirect tools of Allied economic warfare. He also suggests
that the Allied policies toward Switzerland proved more confrontational than similar Axis
efforts, although both blocs placed tremendous pressure on the Swiss to align with their
respective economic and military objectives. While the British and American measures
to cripple Switzerland’s trade with Germany provided the Allies with a powerful weapon
against the neutral state, “every curtailment in Germany’s share of [Switzerland’s] trade
gave Germany that much greater incentive to attack and occupy it.” 12 It was no
coincidence, therefore, that in 1943, once the previous Swiss-German trade agreement
expired, Switzerland faced overwhelming pressure from the Axis to continue trading with
and extending credits to the totalitarian bloc. 13
Swiss Trade Negotiators in London
From Switzerland’s perspective, the inability to secure sufficient raw materials
and food from the Allies meant granting greater concessions to Germany. The Allies
expressed escalating anger toward Switzerland for its refusal to end credit clearances to
Germany. An unnamed British MEW official commented in mid-1943, “The Americans
are suggesting a very tough line with the Swiss and are contemplating demands which I
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feel no neutral country can accept.” 14 Echoing this sentiment, the American ambassador
to London cabled the State Department with a warning not to act in a confrontational
manner during talks with the Swiss delegation. Ambassador Winant wrote,
You seem to feel that Swiss negotiators if once they were
here would be forced to concede quick concessions. We
feel that, once they are in London, they will be able to
interpose innumerable delays in the negotiations (at which
they are past masters) unless we succeed in forcing the
Swiss Government into a spirit of compromise before the
delegation is dispatched. 15
While the American ambassador was correct in his assessment of Swiss abilities
to resist excessive demands, he failed to realize the desperate situation in which
Switzerland found itself during 1943. Given the weak negotiating position of
Switzerland, concessions proved unavoidable. In October 1943, the Federal Council
began to reduce export quotas for strategic goods intended for Germany. One month
later, a second decree made it illegal for Swiss firms to deal in any capacity with foreign
embassies. Through these concessions, Swiss officials sought to reduce the Allied
pressures applied to Switzerland by way of blocking assets, blacklisting, and other forms
of economic reprisal.
Having been in London since 1942, Swiss trade delegates Keller, Sulzer, and
Rappard remained in constant contact with American Bureau of Economic Warfare
negotiators and British MEW officials Winfield Riefler and Dingle M. Foot. The
constantly eroding trust between Swiss and Allied officials limited the success of these
talks. The two sides only reached compensation agreements. The historian Georg Kreis
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saw that by 1943, “Swiss foreign trade was trapped in a vicious circle.” 16 The Swiss
desperately needed Axis industrial contracts to prevent massive unemployment. To the
Swiss trade negotiators, the fact that unemployment had declined to 8000, or 0.6 percent
of the population from a high of 28,000 in 1939 was attributed to the industrial
relationship with Germany. 17 At the same time, the Swiss increasingly relied on the
Allies for food deliveries. Reacting to criticisms from British officials concerning Swiss
trade with Germany, negotiator Paul Keller issued a stern memorandum to the Allies
following the December 1942 compensation agreements. To the Allied representatives
Keller explained the predicament faced by him and the other Swiss trade negotiators:
We cannot have unemployment in the metal industry,
particularly that employing highly skilled labor. It is
impossible politically for us to say to our people they must
go on relief because we will not let them manufacture for
Germany, especially when Germany is willing to furnish all
of the materials and we furnish only the employment. You
can cut down on our food if you want to go that far and we
can tighten our belts and still remain free, but if you force
us to throw our skilled workers into unemployment they
will either go to Germany to work and we won’t dare to
stop them under the circumstances, or they will force us to
come to terms with Germany completely. 18
The limited progress of Swiss-Allied trade talks caused the two sides to agree in
principle to maintain reciprocity in imports and exports. While the Swiss upheld their
end of the agreement, the Allies withheld promised food deliveries. Part of the reason for
difficulties was that during 1943 the ratio of Axis to Allied trade was dramatically
unbalanced. In that year, the ratio equaled Sfr. 425 million in exports to the Axis and Sfr.
17.8 million to the Allies. Credit clearances to Germany had surpassed the billion-franc
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mark, thus further damaging the dynamic of Swiss-Allied relations. Dingle M. Foot
compared these credit clearances to Germany with that of “political life insurance.” 19
The Allies became aware that Germany’s policy of securing credits from Switzerland
proved more effective than the economic warfare efforts of the British blockade.
US General Ruling No. 17
The contentious issues surrounding Swiss omnibus accounts and blocked assets
held in the US reached new intensity in late 1943. Although Swiss officials agreed
earlier that year to release the names of omnibus account holders to the US Treasury
Department, the major banks and the Federal Council expressed their anger over a new
regulation called General Ruling No. 17. In a memorandum to the Swiss National Bank
dated 20 October 1943, American financial negotiators attacked Switzerland. In
bellicose language, the Treasury Department criticized the Swiss banking industry and
the federal government. “You Swiss,” began the memo, “you had the chance to provide
the proof that the money deposited with you actually belonged to you. You did not
provide the proof therefore you will have to suffer the consequences.” 20
General Ruling No. 17 intended to distinguish between assets held by Swiss
individuals or firms in the United States that were seen as legitimate by the Treasury
Department, and those for which no such proof had been provided. Swiss banks were
required to establish the nationality of clients or face blacklisting and freezing of the
assets in question. The Swiss government’s financial advisor, Joseph Staessle, outlined
the issues bankers faced under these new US restrictions in a letter to foreign policy
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analyst Pierre Bonna. Staessle accurately gauged the tone of American policies toward
Switzerland. He wrote to his colleague in Bern that the US Treasury Department’s
. . . attitude toward our country is so biased and unfriendly
that it will be no small task to surmount it. They make the
accusation that all of our economic and financial actions
shows that we are subject to German pressure and that
apparently are willing to make concessions to our northern
neighbor that we do not likewise extend to the Allies. 21
Despite Staessle’s comments that American officials viewed the Swiss as
unaccommodating, on 19 December 1943, Swiss negotiator Keller agreed to compile a
new list of allowable exports that reflected the weakened position of Switzerland vis-àvis the Allies. Through this new Swiss-Allied trade agreement, Switzerland reduced
arms and munitions deliveries to Germany by 45 percent of the 1942 levels. A second
condition of the new trade agreement stipulated that Swiss firms had to cut exports of
other precision goods and components by 60 percent. Angering the Allied trade officials
was the refusal of Switzerland to reduce credit extensions to Germany. 22 One result of
these limitations on Swiss weapons deliveries was that during 1943, Switzerland
maintained a positive trade balance with Germany for the first time in the Second World
War. Imports from Germany totaled Sfr. 532.5 million while exports to the Third Reich
reached Sfr. 598.4 million. The export figure declined from the wartime high of Sfr.
655.6 million during 1942. 23
Through the 22 February 1944 Declaration on Gold Purchases, the Allies refused
to recognize transfers of looted gold from Germany and henceforth blocked all gold trade
with countries that maintained relations with the Axis. American officials demanded
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compliance with the February declaration. To force cooperation, the Treasury
Department threatened Swiss banks with being placed on a list of firms that acted in an
“imprudent” manner by “promoting the enemy war effort.” 24 Applying even more
pressure on Switzerland, the Allies demanded that trade with Germany had to be reduced
by an additional Sfr. 100 million over the course of 1944. In exchange, the Allies
promised navicerts for 350,000 tons of wheat, sugar, and fats. 25
The Slow Collapse of Nazi Hegemony and Transitioning to Phase Three
The German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943 marked the transition to phase
three of the war for Switzerland. The previous pattern that had characterized relations
with Nazi Germany no longer held true during 1943. Germany’s withholding of coal,
iron, and other industrial commodities forced Switzerland in turn to withhold ball
bearings, fuses, motors, and other goods, thereby necessitating a new trade agreement.
On 15 January 1943, the previous Swiss-German trade agreement expired. Allied
pressure to end credit extensions and trade with Germany led to hostile negotiations with
the Axis. The ability of the Allies to intensify their economic warfare objectives was tied
directly to the decline in Germany’s dominance over the European continent. In this
period of uncertainty for Germany, Nazi State Secretary Landfried commented on the
outlook of Hitler:
He thought it desirable in principle to be tough towards
Switzerland; but one must not go too far, as one had to
assume that if we were to wage an open trade war,
Switzerland would find other alternatives . . . . The Führer
therefore considers it right that we do not block all further
opportunities for negotiation, in case Switzerland does not
give in to our demands. 26
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By the summer of 1943, German debt to Switzerland had skyrocketed while the
counter-blockade had begun to show clear signs of weakness. The German debt had
reached Sfr. 1.5 billion which is often called the “clearing billion,” or “collaboration
billion.” 27 Gold transactions with Germany also continued. Between January and
October 1943, Swiss officials and the Army General Staff felt as if a Nazi invasion was
most probable. Until Switzerland and Germany reached a new trade agreement in
October, public fears of such an invasion spiraled out of control. A commonly held
belief among the Swiss public was that Germany would not pay back its debt and would
thus invade Switzerland to ensure the continued flow of weapons and precision goods
into the Reich. The credit extension of Sfr. 270 million to Germany that Switzerland
conceded in the new trade agreement deepened both Swiss and Allied suspicions of
German intentions. 28
A December 1943 Nazi report commented on the continued importance of
Switzerland’s contributions to the German war effort. The so-called Studie Böhme noted
the pivotal role of Swiss north-south transit routes and communication links. The authors
of the report argued:
The prize to be realized [by an invasion] will be the
elimination of the last anti-German army in Central Europe,
the taking of arms as booty, the possession of valuable
industrial plants for the war industry, and the control of
important railway lines. However, even after the
subjugation of the Swiss army, German security forces will
have to stay permanently to pacify the country. As to time,
in principle we might say this must preclude an invasion of
Allied forces in Europe . . . . Should Switzerland behave
in a way unacceptable to Germany, the complete
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encirclement of the country already offers the possibility to
press for policy changes by blocking all supplies. 29
The study failed to take into account the shifting military situation that increasingly
favored the Allies. An example of this altered shift of military power was that only in
1943 was Switzerland’s trade balance with Germany positive. In this year, it proved
impossible to conduct courant normal trade with Germany, while the central importance
of Switzerland’s invisible export sector was evident.
The Safehaven Program
The decline of German military power led to a corresponding increase in Allied
fears of Germany seeking to hide assets in order to prevent their use for reparations and
European reconstruction. According to the US Eizenstat Report, published in 1997, the
goal of Allied economic warfare against Germany now expressly intended to confront
this problem. The Allies demanded that Switzerland not cooperate in the transfer of
looted assets and flight capital into Swiss accounts. US Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau, Jr. was responsible for implementing Operation Safehaven. The US-led
effort aimed to locate Nazi “safe havens” throughout the world and block the transfer of
funds into them. 30 By the spring of 1944, American economic warfare goals consisted of
the following:
. . . to restrict and prevent German economic penetration
beyond Germany, to block Germany from transferring
assets to neutral countries, to ensure that German wealth
would be accessible for war reparations and for the
rehabilitation of Europe, to make possible the return to
legal owners of properties looted from countries once
occupied by the Germans, and to prevent the escape of
strategic German personnel to neutral havens.
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The “overall purpose,” in the view of the Eizenstat Report, “was to make it
impossible for Germany to start another war.”31 On 9 April 1944, Cordell Hull issued an
ultimatum to neutrals. Punishment would result for countries that continued to assist the
Nazi war effort. The tone of Hull’s speech was firm and failed to recognize the reality
that a large part of Swiss trade with Germany was due to the Allied inability to supply
needed materials to Switzerland. The US demanded that Switzerland cease all trade with
Germany by 1 January 1945. Hull’s speech began,
We can no longer acquiesce to those nations drawing upon
the resources of the Allied world when they at the same
time contribute to the death of troops whose sacrifice
contributes to their salvation as well as ours. We have
scrupulously respected the sovereignty of these nations, and
we have not coerced, nor shall we coerce, any nation to join
us in the fight. We have said to these countries that it is no
longer necessary for them to purchase protection against
aggression by nourishing aid to our enemy. . . . We ask
them only, but with insistence, to cease aiding our enemy. 32
According to Dean Acheson’s memoirs, he persuaded Hull to harden the position
of his speech. “I had long waited,” recalled Acheson, “for an opportunity to push
economic warfare a stage further ahead.” 33 Medlicott views the Anglo-American debate
over Safehaven as a prime example of the different approaches toward economic warfare
taken by Britain and the US. From the British perspective, the actions of the US State
and Treasury Departments towards Switzerland were counterproductive. British
economic warfare officials felt that the hostility of the US would lead Switzerland to
continue its trade relationship with Germany. Britain desired to continue its naval
blockade to choke Germany further, while the US sought to shift the focus of economic
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warfare to purely financial attacks against countries that still cooperated with the Nazi
regime. The inability to reach a coordinated policy towards Switzerland led to “the last
of the long series of Anglo-American differences over tactics, and it arose, as so often
before, through the American tendency to concentrate on a single objective to the
exclusion of supply and other interests which the British could not so readily ignore.” 34
Switzerland could not ignore such interests either.
The historian Tom Bower observes, “The Foreign Office and the State
Department were resigned to the fact that the Swiss would always choose the Germans in
preference to the Allies unless there was an opportunity to drive a wedge between
Switzerland and Germany.” 35 Safehaven provided the Allies with such an opportunity.
The collapse of Nazi hegemony on the European continent forced Switzerland to contend
with outrageous demands dictated by the Allies. By the middle of 1943, Switzerland
deeply resented the treatment it received from the Allies. In fact, Federal Councilor
Walther Stamfli noted, “We were never as badly treated by the Germans as we are now
by the Allies.” 36 The Allies demanded in April 1944 that Switzerland disregard its
obligations as a neutral and side exclusively with Britain and the United States against
Germany. Doing so would have signaled a retreat from the foreign policy line that had
until this point enabled Switzerland to remain a sovereign and independent democracy.
The capitulation of Italy in the autumn of 1943 brought Nazi armies to
Switzerland’s southern border and generated shockwaves of fear throughout the small
country that invasion remained a genuine possibility. During this period, no Swiss-Nazi
trade agreement existed and greatly increased the likelihood of Germany taking measures
34
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against Switzerland. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden commented on the
precarious position of Switzerland vis-à-vis Germany. Eden felt that in September 1943,
the Allies were
. . . not in the present circumstances to be too severe with
the Swiss. . . . on the whole they are behaving pretty well.
. . . We are at present expecting them to receive large
numbers of escaped British prisoners from Italy. . . . The
closing of [the port of] Genoa cuts their last link with the
outside world. Until we clear the Germans out of Northern
Italy the Swiss will be even more completely surrounded
and even more subject to German pressure. 37
The Soviet victory at Stalingrad, the defeat of the Afrika Korps, and the
Normandy invasions of 1944 led to a shift in the tide of war that now overwhelmingly
favored the Allies. With the military situation altered, so too did Allied economic
warfare objectives change. The blockade remained an integral component of Allied
plans, but now included the goal of preventing Germany’s access to the resources of
neutrals to ensure that Nazi military power would not increase again, thereby shortening
the duration of the war. The main goal therefore was to prevent Germany from being
able to rearm itself over the long term.
Bretton Woods and the Swiss-Allied Trade Agreement of 1944
The United States unquestioningly led the way towards implementing Operation
Safehaven. Stuart Eizenstat correctly notes that internal disagreements among the Allies
and within the United States hurt the effectiveness of the program. Safehaven
nevertheless presented Switzerland with the need to justify and defend its wartime
conduct. The Allies launched Safehaven following the end of the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference (Bretton Woods Resolutions) in July 1944. The
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focus of the Bretton Woods talks was the creation of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. These organizations demonstrated to Switzerland that the
US now possessed the power to shape the outcome of the conference in its favor. In
essence, the United States now proved able to define the international system as it saw fit,
while Switzerland’s world power continued to wane.
Resolution VI barred neutrals from receiving looted assets from Germany in order
to free these funds for use in European reconstruction. The resolution aimed to “prevent
any disposition, transfer, or concealment of looted gold or other assets from the occupied
nations of Europe.” 38 The Allies issued a stern warning to neutral Switzerland: “. . . that
under the prevailing circumstances, it would be in the banks’ own interest to exercise the
greatest caution and restraint in all transactions with foreign countries.” 39 Resolution VI
became the cornerstone of the Safehaven Program in general and specifically set up the
framework for subsequent negotiations with neutrals. The actual text of the resolution
ominously warned that “enemy leaders, enemy nationals and their collaborators are
transferring assets to and through neutral countries in order to conceal them and to
perpetuate their influence, power, and ability to plan future aggrandizement and world
domination.” 40
While it is undeniably true that Nazi officials and businessmen sought to remain
powerful despite the decline of German military power, it is my belief that Switzerland
was unfairly demonized. Throughout the war, Switzerland sought the assistance of the
Allies in order to reduce their reliance on the Third Reich. Switzerland risked Axis
retribution for allowing the US to set up the Office of Strategic Services headquarters for
38
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Europe in Bern. The OSS proved an invaluable source of intelligence for the Allies in
uncovering the trail of looted Nazi gold and other assets. Both the British and American
militaries repeatedly commented on the cooperation of Swiss industries in providing the
Allies with precision goods and weaponry. The Swiss firm Oerlikon, for example,
allowed the production of their patented weaponry to occur in the United States in order
to allow the Allies to circumvent the German counter-blockade. Safehaven seemed
excessively harsh given the attitude expressed by the State Department in a midDecember 1944 report.
The US State Department’s Western European experts then expressed their
understanding of “Switzerland’s unique position as a neutral.” The American report saw
that “for political reasons and for reasons arising out of the benefits to us of Switzerland’s
neutral position and her future potential usefulness in the economy of Europe, it was
inadvisable to place too great a pressure upon the Swiss Government at this time in order
to attain pure economic objectives.” 41 Unfortunately, for Switzerland, precisely the
opposite situation developed. The State Department experts were largely ignored
because the requirements of Bretton Woods and Safehaven meant the Allies had to
assume a harsh stance towards neutrals that were seen as uncooperative. The efforts to
eliminate the last bastions of Nazi power led to Switzerland’s entanglement in an
economic war in which it desired no part. It is thus reasonable to criticize the US for
acting in a dualistic manner. If American interests were best served by manipulating and
coercing Switzerland, the attitude taken by US officials was that of disregard for Swiss
rights as a sovereign and neutral country. As such, the hostile stance of the United States
led to an equally stubborn stance on behalf of Swiss trade delegates.
41
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By the end of 1944, it was clear to the US that Switzerland’s contributions as a
protecting power for American and British prisoners-of-war and its mediation services as
a neutral necessitated a modicum of restraint in forcing Switzerland to comply with
Safehaven financial restrictions. An example of American moderation toward
Switzerland is evident in the Allied reversal of the embargo that had been in force since
April 1943. The June 1944 lifting of this embargo saw Switzerland become more
conciliatory regarding Allied demands. The Foreign Affairs contributor Warner Richter
observed in the July 1944 issue of the journal a reason why Switzerland expressed greater
willingness to comply with American and British war objectives. Richter wrote, “As the
war in Europe reaches its climax the position of Switzerland becomes more
precarious.” 42 With Germany proving less able to provide Switzerland with needed coal
and other industrial commodities, the small state faced no other choice than to shift its
economic priorities to favor the Allies.
Beginning in August 1944, joint Anglo-American talks with Switzerland had
secured a concrete pledge that the neutral would reduce its export deliveries to Germany.
Following the fall of Rome and the Allied landings in Southern France, the State
Department again escalated its demands of the Swiss Federal Council. On 7 September
1944, the State Department issued a statement to the Swiss government. The State
Department insisted that Switzerland cease trading with Germany and close the Gotthard
and Simplon Tunnels to Axis transit. The tone of the statement was forceful:
The rapid changes during recent weeks in the military
situation, whereby Allied forces have reached the Swiss
border and Germany’s blockade has been raised, have
radically altered the economic position of Switzerland. Her
Majesty’s Government and the United States Government
42
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. . . feel impelled to request the Swiss Government to
prohibit at once all economic assistance to the United
Nations’ enemies of immediate benefit to the latter’s war
effort. 43
Partly because of an Allied warning, but more so due to economic realities, the
Federal Council issued a decree on 1 October 1944 that banned the export of strategic
goods and closed the north-south transit routes to all belligerents. Another concession
had previously been granted in September of that year. The Swiss Banking Association
and the Credit Suisse banks now prohibited gold transactions with Germany. The Credit
Suisse Group presented the SBA with a list of new recommendations to cope with the
Bretton Woods Resolutions and the Safehaven Program. On 12 September 1944, the
bank executives set forth that “Effective immediately, we strictly prohibit the following
types of transactions:
The import and export and all trade in pounds and dollars
for one’s own account or a third-party account. Currency
and gold transactions, whether spot or forward, with
enemies of the government of Great Britain or the USA.
The opening of any new account of any type for or on
behalf of enemies . . .
The receipt of deposits . . . of any kind for or on behalf of
enemies . . .
Purchase and sales, or the facilitation of transactions, or the
extension of any credit involving assets in which the enemy
. . . has a direct or indirect interest . . .
The extension of loans, advances or account overdrafts, or
any other financial services that in any way facilitate or
enable trade with the enemy . . .
The extension of new loans, advances or overdraft
provisions to enemies . . . 44
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On 2 October 1944, the United States and British governments instructed their
embassies in Switzerland to take steps to ensure successful implementation of Safehaven
objectives. In December, the US State Department issued its Circular Instruction to US
Missions on how to enforce Bretton Woods Resolution VI. Stuart Eizenstat notes that the
distribution of this memo marked the beginning of the political and diplomatic phases of
the Safehaven Program began. It was clear that the economic blockade measures by
themselves were ineffective in thwarting Nazi trade with neutrals. He observes, “Only as
the military balance passed permanently to the Allied side, and recognizably so to the
neutrals, did the economic blockade and with that the Safehaven program, begin to show
results.” 45 The policy paper argued that Switzerland remained unique in comparison with
other European neutrals and that the good offices and humanitarian services, as well as
the possible financial contributions to postwar reconstruction were invaluable to the
Allies. Softening of the United States position was more rhetoric than reality; it was the
United States that remained the most hostile towards Switzerland.
The Currie Mission
The stalemate in Swiss-Allied negotiations continued into January 1945. For
Switzerland, the inability of either bloc to provide necessary raw materials and food
imports made the situation all the more urgent. To break the deadlock in Swiss-Allied
negotiations, President Roosevelt decided to send a delegation to Switzerland. He chose
his personal assistant, Lauchlin Currie, to head the US negotiating team. Britain in turn
chose Dingle Foot to represent the interests of the UK. The negotiations that led to the
so-called Currie Agreement began on 12 February 1945. The Swiss entered into parallel
negotiations with Germany on the same day. Regarding the Swiss-German relationship,
45
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the main issue at hand was the possible extension of a trade agreement that was due to
expire three days later.
Swiss negotiators aimed to act in such a manner as to force the Germans to refuse
the renewal without making Switzerland seem as the culprit. At the start of its
negotiations with the Allies, the Swiss representatives received the text of Bretton Woods
Resolution VI. Switzerland argued that this resolution and the Safehaven Program were
inconsistent with the international conventions that formed the basis for Swiss neutrality.
The need presented itself, therefore, to devise a solution that proved compatible with the
unique Swiss situation. In an effort to break the stalemate, the Federal Council issued a
decree on 16 February that blocked all German assets held in Swiss accounts. Swiss
negotiator Walter Stucki hoped this act would be interpreted as a gesture of goodwill at
the outset of the talks.
The action served little purpose, as the Allies insisted Switzerland conduct a
survey of all capital assets of Axis nationals held in Swiss banks. Such a survey not only
violated Swiss banking secrecy but also instilled fear within the Swiss delegates that the
position of Switzerland as a major player in the international capital markets would be
compromised severely. The Federal Council complied with American demands anyhow.
From then on, two new departments of the Swiss Compensation Office would control all
Swiss assets blocked in the US: (1) the Department for German Assets, and (2) the
Department for US Certification. 46
The Currie Agreement was finalized by means of exchanging notes between the
US and Switzerland on 8 March 1945. Many issues remained unresolved until the
signing of the 1946 Washington Accord. Perhaps the most contentious issue was the
46
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continuance of Allied blacklisting measures against Switzerland. Switzerland, for its
part, granted sweeping economic concessions in order to end its isolation from the Allies.
Although the Swiss delegates protested, the Federal Council decided to rescind banking
secrecy protections to provide the US with names of the account holders in question. The
United States in return agreed to open French transit routes to supply Switzerland with
desperately needed coal and food supplies. In his discussion of the Currie Agreement,
Eizenstat argues that despite the persistent disagreements between Switzerland and the
United States, the negotiations “represented both a substantive and psychological
watershed for the Swiss.” He means that for the first time since June 1940, Switzerland
was freed of the threat posed by Nazi aggression.
The historian Arthur L. Funk interviewed Lauchlin Currie in 1983, inquiring into
the outlook of the head US official. Funk asked Currie what he felt were the principal
issues of the agreement. Currie responded that he had been well aware of the tremendous
difficulties faced by Switzerland in obtaining coal imports. Currie recalled “for that
reason I relied on this as our main bargaining point.” He told Funk that the United States
did not substitute “the carrot for the stick but we supplemented threats with promises.”
The United States aimed to curtail all gold and weapons transactions between
Switzerland and Germany. Currie also noted his surprise concerning the vehemently
anti-Nazi stance of the Swiss delegation. 47 Despite the progress made through the Currie
Agreement, deep-rooted mutual mistrust continued to characterize Swiss-American
relations. In the concluding chapter, I shall examine the steps taken by the United States
and Switzerland to reduce this tension. As the final issue of my study, I shall then
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analyze the various arguments of Swiss and American officials concerning Swiss conduct
during the Second World War and into the postwar period.
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CHAPTER 4: SWITZERLAND IN THE POSTWAR ERA

The Currie Agreement left many issues unresolved between Switzerland and the
United States. Actions taken by Swiss businessmen and bankers during the war
continued to plague Swiss-American relations into the postwar period. For allowing
looted gold and plundered art into Switzerland, the Federal Council and the Swiss
National Bank faced harsh criticisms from Allied officials. Blacklisting of Swiss
companies continued, while the frozen assets held in the United States remained
inaccessible. Tensions mounted between Allied and Swiss negotiators. One reason for
the worsening relations stemmed from a Newsweek article published on 15 January 1945.
In this article, Newsweek reported that Swiss firms continued to provide Germany with
“war-aiding material,” despite the 1944 ban. The American government threatened
Switzerland with intensified sanctions and continued the blacklisting of offending
weapons firms.
American Secretary of State Edward Stettinius reacted to the accusations by
arguing that the United States sought to improve Swiss-American relations, not to worsen
them further. Stettinius stated that the American government viewed Switzerland as “the
guardian of American interests in both Germany and Japan” and that “if Switzerland’s
neutrality were ended suddenly by a Swiss-German break, the United States would also
lose its direct link with its interests in Germany.” 1 Despite the reassuring words of
Stettinius, the American government continued to demand that Switzerland align behind
US interests. President Roosevelt wrote to Swiss President Eduard von Steiger on 19
1
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January 1945 regarding the press reports of continued Swiss-German trade. FDR
warned:
We have respected the traditional neutrality of your country
and have sympathized with the past difficulties of your
position. We forbore pressing our demands when you were
isolated by our enemy and were in no position to do other
than carry on a large trade with him. Now, however, the
fortunes of war have changed. We are now in a better
position to meet your most urgent needs if they are
threatened. 2
The Swiss saw the situation differently. From the perspective of President Steiger,
because the Allies did not adequately help Switzerland during the war, it had no choice
other than to forge tighter trade ties with Germany. Thus, once the Allies agreed on the
conditions of the 2 August 1945 Potsdam Protocol, Swiss and American rapprochement
efforts both ended swiftly.
The Potsdam Declaration and the Allied Reparations Policy
While the victorious Allies drafted the Potsdam Protocol, the issues of Nazi gold,
dormant assets, and Swiss wartime conduct figured into their thinking. Through the
Potsdam Declaration, the Allies formally adopted the Safehaven Program that aimed to
pinpoint looted Nazi assets and ensure adequate funds for European reconstruction. The
Potsdam conference built upon the Bretton Woods Resolutions and outlined the Allied
reparations policy. German assets in neutral countries would revert to the Allied powers
in the western part of the former Third Reich while the Soviet Union demanded all
capital held in areas occupied by the Red Army. Reparations were to be paid via
unclaimed German assets held outside Germany. The Allies informed Switzerland of this
policy in a note dated 4 August 1945. In their communiqué to the Federal Council, the
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Allies informed the Swiss government that the best way to secure funds for reparations
was through the seizing of German assets held outside the defeated Axis country.
From the Swiss standpoint, the problems of blacklists, blocked assets, and tax
receipts continued to distance the neutral state from the former belligerents. The Federal
Council delayed its response until 27 September 1945. In its reply, the Swiss government
argued that no legal basis existed for the Allied reparations policy. The Swiss
government never allowed foreigners access to funds held in Switzerland, and it felt this
situation was no different. Furthermore, the Federal Council argued it was against
Western legal concepts to force German citizens to pay based on the notion of collective
guilt for Nazi actions in the Second World War. 3
Although the Federal Council waited to react to the Potsdam conditions, one
Federal Councilor, Max Petitpierre, offered his opinion to the New York Times.
Petitpierre boldly asserted that “Those who reproach us today for our neutrality forget
that this country, even when in mortal danger and practically alone as the representative
of democratic ideals on the subjugated continent of Europe,” resisted all pressures from
the outside and remained an independent country. He continued by asking a question:
“As a belligerent state, invaded as the other countries of the continent, would we have
been more useful than by remaining neutral?” 4 The answer for the majority of Swiss
people was a resounding “no.”
Allied Control Council Law No. 5
Yet another turn for the worse in Swiss-Allied relations occurred on 30 October
1945. The Allied Control Council issued its Law No. 5, “On the Vesting and Marshalling
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of German External Assets,” which revoked the right of German individuals and
companies to access to their assets held outside of Germany. Although American
President Harry Truman backed this demonstration of Allied legal force, British Prime
Minister Clement Atlee and Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin were not as certain. The Allied
Control Council Law No. 5 broke the consensus previously enjoyed by the Allies. 5 With
their unified stance threatened, the Allies faced a difficult negotiating situation with
Switzerland.
The Federal Council argued that Law No. 5 was inapplicable to assets held inside
Switzerland, as Swiss law protected the property of foreigners and that the “Allied
demands were diametrically opposed to international private law.” 6 The British position
remained less hostile than that of the United States. The Treasury Department, for
example, felt it inappropriate to lessen its demands upon Switzerland since, in its view,
that country had failed to fulfill the obligations outlined by Operation Safehaven. Despite
disagreements among the Allies, Truman proved able to secure a plan to deal with the
disposition of monetary gold found inside Germany. Truman’s idea was to establish a
“gold pot” whereby the Allies would collect all monetary assets held in Germany and the
neutral countries. The pooled funds would then be redistributed to the occupied countries
whose central banks had been looted by the conquering Nazi armies. 7
The Paris Reparations Conference
In November and December 1945, eighteen nations met for the Paris Reparations
Conference. At this conference, the Allies expanded the Bretton Woods and Potsdam
efforts to collect and redistribute looted assets and outlined a policy to liquidate German
5
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assets held in neutral safe havens. To contend with American pressures, the Federal
Council dispatched a delegation to Washington, DC on 23 November 1945. On the
agenda were eight problematic issues from the standpoint of the Federal Council. These
points of contention formed the basis for later talks between the Allies and Switzerland
during 1946. The US continued to pressure Switzerland to grant the Allied Control
Council access to Swiss funds. Treasury Department officials succeeded in withholding
$1.2 billion in Swiss assets until the German reparations and monetary gold questions
were resolved. Blacklisting continued while the Allies sought to galvanize international
public opinion and the press to isolate Switzerland, thus allowing for a stronger Allied
negotiating stance.
On 14 January 1946, the Allies concluded the Paris Reparations Agreement. A
main result was the establishment of the Tripartite Gold Commission whose task was to
distribute the liquidated assets held in neutral countries and monetary gold held within
Germany itself. In Article 6a of the agreement, the United States, France, and Great
Britain were to negotiate with Switzerland issues of Nazi gold and looted assets held
inside Switzerland. Compliance on behalf of Switzerland meant the Allies would begin
removing Swiss firms from American and British blacklists. The Allies stipulated in
Article 6c that
German assets in those countries, which remained neutral
in the war against Germany, shall be removed from
German ownership and control and liquidated or disposed
of in accordance with the authority of France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States pursuant to arrangements
to be negotiated with the neutrals by these countries. The
net proceeds of liquidation or disposition shall be made
available to the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency. 8
8
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The Swiss delegation sent to Washington during 1945 experienced no success in
lessening the demands of American negotiators. In response to the negotiating standstill,
the Federal Council appointed a new delegation, headed by Walter Stucki. Treasury
Department official Rudolph Paul led the United States’ delegation. In February 1946,
after six tough plenary sessions, Stucki returned to Switzerland to develop a new strategy.
Problems arose immediately. On the side of the Allies, British and French disagreements
over the harsh stance of their American counterparts caused serious policy-making
setbacks. Not only were the Allies divided, but so too was the American government.
Secretary of State Byrnes clashed with the Treasury Department. The Treasury
Department advised Byrnes to impose full economic sanctions if negotiations failed, but
luckily, for Switzerland, the Secretary of State ignored that recommendation.
Switzerland, for its part, continued to abide by its argument that Allied Control Council
Law No. 5, the Potsdam Protocol, and Operation Safehaven violated its rights under
international law.
Negotiations for the Washington Accord Begin, March 1946
On 29 March 1946, the Allies outlined their demands of Switzerland in a
memorandum. Preventing the rearmament of Germany through dispossessing assets held
inside Switzerland and freeing those funds for reparations and European reconstruction
were the main American objectives. Urged by the State Department, the American
delegation demonstrated a degree of flexibility by compromising on the issue of the final
distribution of the German assets. Instead of direct Allied distribution of seized assets,
the US conceded that a Swiss governmental body, supervised by a mixed Allied-Swiss
commission, place the proceeds in a fund in which some of the total would go to
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Switzerland. The American concession offered little hope for breaking the stalemated
talks. More than one month passed, and the negotiators had accomplished nothing. The
Swiss delegation refused to acknowledge the legality of Allied claims to German assets.
Even worse, the Swiss refused to admit they had received any monetary gold at all during
the Second World War. Later on, however, the Swiss reversed their position on that
issue.
Switzerland argued that because Germany had been a conquering nation, under
the conditions of international law, they had the right to the looted assets as war booty.
The Allies frustrated the Swiss by employing precisely the same argument to rationalize
the Safehaven Program. In response to this Allied position, the Swiss continued to insist
that no foreign government had the right to seize assets held in Switzerland since it was
not a conquered nation and had always remained outside the scope of the military
conflict.
Although Stuart E. Eizenstat’s 1997 report aimed at lambasting Switzerland for its
wartime trade with Germany, he articulates the Swiss position succinctly and clearly:
Swiss leadership believed that Swiss actions during the war
were fully consistent with the internationally recognized
obligations and rights of a neutral power. The Swiss
asserted that they were equally convinced that Nazi
Germany’s seizure of monetary gold from the occupied
countries accorded with international law; therefore,
Switzerland’s receipt of such gold was legal. On the other
hand, Swiss officials contended that Allied claims to
German assets beyond Germany’s borders were illegal and
an assault on Swiss sovereignty. 9
Since the Swiss were correct in their legalistic justifications, the Americans then switched
strategy, henceforth appealing to the moral and humanitarian reasons for seizing the
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assets in question. The American delegation argued that these funds would be dedicated
to European reconstruction and in assisting war victims and refugees.
On 12 April 1946, the Washington negotiations resumed after the failed March
round of talks. To break the stalemate, Stucki offered to allocate Sfr. 100 million for
European reconstruction. The Swiss refused, however, to submit to any legal
commitment or binding obligation. The Americans in turn lowered their estimate of
looted monetary gold held in Switzerland from $ 398 million to $130 million (the amount
of gold looted from the Belgian central bank). With the reduced estimate, Switzerland
owed $130 million to settle the gold question. As a condition for agreeing to this gold
amount, Stucki demanded that Switzerland receive two-thirds of the proceeds from
liquidated German assets. 10 Switzerland refused this revised offer. As a result,
negotiations continued into May with little success.
In May, both sides agreed to a two-part compromise. First, the Swiss conceded
they held approximately $88 million in looted gold from the Belgian central bank.
Keeping with the initial US demand that Switzerland pay two-thirds of its questionable
monetary gold to the Allies, the American delegation agreed that the Swiss would pay
$58 million. Second, the American and Swiss delegates agreed to split the proceeds of
German liquidated assets. Half became the property of Switzerland, while the other half
ended up in Allied accounts. Neither side could agree on an estimate of German assets
held inside Switzerland. The Swiss conceded a value of $250 million, while US
estimates were much higher. Swiss delegation head Stucki informed the Allies that this
figure represented Switzerland’s contribution to European reconstruction. After the
Swiss received support for their proposal from the British and French governments,
10
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reluctant Treasury Department officials softened their stance and accepted the two-part
offer. 11
The Washington Accord
The Allies and Switzerland signed the Washington Accord on 25 May 1946. In
return for Swiss compliance with the conditions of the accord, the United States began to
unblock frozen assets of the Swiss government and the Swiss National Bank that
remained in American accounts. In addition, the US ended the blacklisting of Swiss
firms and individuals while establishing an agency inside the government for liquidating
German external assets. The U.S. removal of Swiss firms from the blacklists coincided
with the signing of the Washington Accord in May 1946. A problem soon arose,
however, concerning the exchange rate for liquidating German assets. Switzerland
demanded a fair rate of exchange between the Reichsmark and the Swiss franc. Until the
Allies agreed upon such a fair rate, the Swiss refused to implement the conditions of the
accord. The Swiss government cooperated regarding the payment of the Sfr 250 million
($58 million) for reconstruction, but refused to proceed with the liquidation of German
assets. The issue of the Reichsmark-Swiss franc exchange rate remained unresolved until
1952.
In July 1947, the New York Times reported that France and Britain desired Swiss
involvement in the Marshall Plan. The American paper sympathized with the Swiss
position despite the hostility exhibited by the Treasury Department toward Switzerland.
The New York Times argued, “In the numerous trade and payments agreements concluded
[thus far], Switzerland has gone as far in rendering financial aid to Europe as was
consistent with her own economic stability.” The newspaper article supported the Swiss
11
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position, stating that proportionally, Switzerland had been more than generous in terms of
dealing with the postwar refugee and reconstruction crises, despite their unwillingness to
participate directly in the war. “Observers here say,” the article continued, “the record
proves that the aims of Swiss policy always have been identical with those of the
Marshall Plan.” 12 Thus, the American paper supported the notion that Switzerland best
served the interests of the Allies by remaining a neutral bystander.
Two months later, the New York Times reported on the progress of implementing
the Washington Accord. The article’s caption, “Liquidation of Nazi Funds Halted in
Switzerland” summed up the situation. 13 The Swiss government refused to implement
the accord because the United States insisted on setting the Reichsmark-Swiss franc
exchange rate unilaterally. To the Swiss, the American exchange rate greatly devalued
the franc. To the Americans, the Swiss were simply stubborn. Later in September, due
to the stalemate over the exchange rate, the Americans turned the issue over to the InterAllied Reparations Agency.
Switzerland demonstrated willingness to compromise once again despite its sense
that German asset holders deserved some form of compensation for their cooperation.
The Swiss government offered Sfr. 50 million ($11.7 million), but the US thought this
would harm the urgent effort to liquidate Nazi external assets. Because the US viewed
Switzerland’s cooperation as vital for accomplishing the liquidation efforts, American
officials agreed to lower their estimate of German assets from $230 million to $115
million. 14 In 1948, the US agreed to accept Sfr. 20 million as an advance on the total
amount owed by the Swiss. The following year, the implementation of the accord again
12
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confronted obstacles. Once the US sought further funds from Switzerland, the Swiss
refused to cooperate until the issue of the Reichsmark-Swiss franc exchange rate was
settled. State Department officials felt as though Swiss intransigence in implementing
the accord would harm US-West German relations and might lead to further calls for
compensation to the owners of the liquidated assets.
The Struggle to Implement the Washington Accord
In autumn 1950, the US faced the problem of harming its relations with West
Germany. The State Department decided the best course of action was to view the 1946
Washington Accord as flawed, proposing that the Allies withdraw from implementation
of the agreement. The accord effectively became a dead letter, enforced but not
implemented. In mid-1951, Switzerland and the Allies finally made progress on the issue
of the exchange rate with West Germany. Switzerland and the Allies reached a new
agreement in August 1952 after threats from the Swiss that they wanted to settle the issue
through international arbitration. By sticking to their legalistic arguments against the
Allies, Switzerland proved able to combat excessive US pressure. The final 1952
settlement called for the Swiss to pay Sfr. 121.5 million ($28 million) for liquidated
German assets held in Switzerland. Because Switzerland had already paid Sfr. 20 million
($4.7 million) to the International Refugee Organization, the 1952 payment totaled Sfr.
101.5 million ($24 million). The West German government paid Switzerland Sfr. 121
million as a final condition of the 1952 Swiss-Allied agreement. 15
Swiss Neutrality in the Cold War Era
During the Second World War, American policy tolerated Swiss neutrality
because it provided the US with political and economic benefits. Likewise, entering the
15
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Cold War, the State Department viewed Swiss neutrality as a tool to combat the spread of
communism in Eastern Europe. The issues of European integration and Swiss
membership in the United Nations in turn preoccupied the Swiss. Following the Czech
coup of 1948, for example, the Swiss government sought to find its place in a new
European order. The New York Times reported, “What is emerging is not a movement to
abandon political neutrality.” Instead, “It is rather a redefinition of neutrality in stricter
terms, combined with a reassurance of the right to take sides morally and even
economically, as the Swiss have often done during past conflicts.” 16 In other words, the
impact of World War Two forced Switzerland to reassess its role as a neutral. The Swiss
government thus sought a more active foreign policy to contend with the challenges of
security, economics, and political stability in the Cold War environment.
Federal Councilor Max Petitpierre spearheaded the Swiss efforts to redefine
neutrality for the Cold War era. On the issue of Switzerland’s place in an integrated
Europe, Petitpierre argued the following before the organization in charge of
implementing Marshall Aid: “Our status as neutrals forbids us to take part in any political
alliance, whether open or disguised, but it does not prevent us-- indeed the sense of
solidarity which is the natural counterpart of this same neutrality-- compels us to take part
in the economic rehabilitation of Europe.” 17 Switzerland thus confronted the same issue
that it had faced since the interwar period: how best to ensure that economic integration
would not lead to political dependence on Europe and the United States. The exportreliant Swiss economy required integration into the growing global marketplace, but the
Swiss government and public feared the loss of sovereignty that came with European
16
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political unity. The 1950s was a decade of economic recession for Switzerland that made
integration with other European economies imperative. The Swiss historian Jonathan
Steinberg addresses this issue. He states,
For roughly thirty years, international fascism and the
ensuing Cold War threatened the Confederation externally.
As in the years 1618 to 1648, an entire Swiss generation
had been hermetically sealed off from the general trends of
European development, and in both post-war periods, the
sudden reappearance of strife, rapid change, and innovation
was a shock. 18
In this period of transition, Switzerland sought to insulate itself from trouble by
reaffirming its commitment to neutrality. While Switzerland battled the threats of
nationalism, fascism, Nazism, and communism, it made sense to remain aloof from the
chaos of the outside world. Now, in the face of rapid efforts to unify Europe that
characterized the 1950s, the possibility of a singular Europe threatened to isolate the
Confederation. The Federal Council, led by Petitpierre, sought to transform
Switzerland’s previously passive role in foreign policy into an active platform for
participating in European affairs. Petitpierre discussed the transformation of Swiss
neutrality in an article entitled “Is Swiss Neutrality Still Justified?” He wrote:
Of itself, neutrality is negative since it ordains abstention
and sets limits to a neutral state’s activities in the
international sphere. But our concept of neutrality has
changed. We have striven to make it a basis for action.
While Switzerland’s neutrality may have lost its early
historic significance from the European point of view, on a
wider scale it still has value because it alone allows the
undertaking of certain activities and certain services. 19
In referring to activities and services, Petitpierre wisely mentioned the benevolent aspects
of Swiss neutrality. The “certain activities” he alludes to included Switzerland’s role as a
18
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protecting power for Allied prisoners-of-war as well as its ability to arbitrate
disagreements between Germany, Japan, and the Allies. Petitpierre’s mention of services
referred to the Swiss contribution to humanitarianism through international organizations
like the Red Cross and the assistance it provided (despite its non-member status) to the
newly created United Nations.
Super-Neutrality
One way Petitpierre sought to re-energize Swiss neutrality was by switching the
emphasis of the country’s foreign activities away from strictly humanitarian efforts
towards other social and economic means of participation in the new Europe. In 1954,
Petitpierre and Political Department head Rudolph Bindschedler developed so-called
“super-neutrality.” Petitpierre envisioned this newly defined foreign policy course as
“neutrality that supersedes all else.” 20 The Bindschedler Doctrine outlined the
requirements of this super-neutrality. First, the Swiss government distinguished between
multilateral organizations as either “political” or “technical.” Participation in political
organizations violated super-neutrality, while those of a technical nature did not. Second,
Switzerland pledged non-participation in customs and economics unions. Third,
Switzerland refused to impose economic sanctions on foreign countries. Almost
immediately, pressure from the United States for Switzerland to help restrict the flow of
strategic exports into Eastern Europe saw the violation of super-neutrality.
To avoid economic isolation, Switzerland agreed to help restrict arms sales to
Eastern Bloc countries. In essence, Switzerland’s willingness to cooperate with the
United States on this issue created a situation wherein the neutral aligned with the
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Western Bloc. By supporting American efforts to contain communism, the aims of
super-neutrality became obsolete. Switzerland thus encountered the same problem it
faced during the interwar period. The only difference now was that the United Nations
and the European Community presented realistic long-term opportunities for the
establishment of a functioning international system while the League of Nations did not.
Final Thoughts on Switzerland’s Role in Prolonging the Second World War
Just as Swiss foreign trade policy had been dictated by the whims of the
belligerents during World War Two, so too was Swiss neutrality policy shaped by
international law. I disagree with American criticisms that Switzerland clung to an
excessively legalistic defense of its neutral rights. In comparison to the tremendous
power and influence of the United States, the opposite situation presented itself to the
Swiss. The United States proved able to transcend the limits of the international order,
actually redefining the global economic and political framework as it saw fit. Despite his
ultra-nationalist, social democratic views, the current National Councilor Christoph
Blocher’s views regarding the unfair treatment of Switzerland by the United States have
merit. Blocher refutes the “accusations of ‘legalism’” expressed by the United States as
“nothing other than the expression of a way of thinking which places the power of mighty
nations above the law and rights of the small state.” 21 He rightly identifies the main
source of Swiss-American tensions as stemming from the small state’s lack of power and
the larger states’ monopoly over such power.
The accusation that Switzerland prolonged the war disregards the hardships the
small neutral confronted during the Second World War. It was the American decision to
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freeze Swiss assets that led the Swiss National Bank to accept the first delivery of
Reichsbank gold. It was the Allied blockade and blacklisting measures that forced
Switzerland to align more closely with the German economy. While it is true that
Switzerland did contribute to Nazi Germany’s war effort through the extension of credits
and the export of weapons, its contribution was quantitatively small. Former Federal
Councilor Georges-André Chevallaz correctly asserts, “. . . the economic and commercial
agreements negotiated by Switzerland showed this country’s determination to affirm its
identity and its efforts to make its sovereignty and its neutrality respected.” 22 Swiss
national survival depended on trading with Germany not only to avert invasion, but more
urgently, because the Allies were either unable or unwilling to provide Switzerland with
the goods and food it needed. Switzerland undoubtedly would have preferred not to trade
with Germany, but the exigencies of total war and the asymmetry of the military situation
made such trade unavoidable and inevitable.
Chevallaz believes that because of the high level of assets held abroad, the
dependency of Switzerland on its invisible sector, and the increasing tendency to export
investment capital abroad, the country “. . . had to fulfill its task as a financial transit
point as a mission of its neutrality and a condition of its economic survival.” 23 Because
economic figures for the war are still debated to this day, it is difficult accurately to
assess Switzerland’s role in prolonging the conflict. Of the total amount of money
poured into Germany’s war effort (Sfr. 1172 billion), Switzerland’s yearly contribution
was approximately Sfr. 320 million, or .3 percent overall. 24 Thus, even if these exports
were qualitatively significant (which they were not), in no way were they quantitatively
22
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important. By contrast, especially before the United States entered the war, Swiss
strategic exports to Britain and France were essential for the successful campaign to end
Nazi aggression.
Switzerland’s efforts at adaptation and resistance were not any worse than the
behavior of other neutrals or other belligerents. As a nation, it was aiming to survive and
nothing more. Accusations of profiteering and moral collusion with the Nazi regime fail
to take into account the fact that during the Second World War, the Swiss economy was
in a recession. Skyrocketing prices without a corresponding rise in wages meant
economic hardship for the vast majority of the Swiss people. The Swiss historian Daniel
Bourgeois addresses these accusations. He argues that a complete break with Germany
during the war or a total end to Swiss weapons exports would have spelled disaster for
the economic, financial, and industrial sectors. It is his contention that “wear[ing] a
mantle of virtuous neutrality and complete pacifism while refusing all weapons trade
would have led to nothing more than economic strangulation, unemployment, stagnation”
and the real threat of invasion. 25
In the postwar period, Switzerland’s international image remained tarnished. The
move toward European integration and the creation of the United Nations served to test
the Swiss commitment to neutrality. While the preceding chapters have attempted to
dispel the myths surrounding Swiss wartime behavior, such a clearing of the decks
between the United States and Switzerland has yet to occur.
Switzerland, European Integration, and the Future
In formulating its foreign trade policy for the Cold War era, Switzerland knew
economic openness remained essential. During the Cold War, the central problem that
25
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Switzerland confronted was how to prevent its economic ties from developing into
political dependence on the Western Bloc. Four possible alternatives were open to Swiss
policy-makers. First, Switzerland could continue to follow the path characterized as the
Swiss “special case.” Switzerland had pursued some variation of the special case since
its experiment with differential neutrality during the 1930s. Continuing to abide by this
option meant Switzerland would maintain a high degree of national political and
diplomatic autonomy while at the same time seeking greater economic integration with
the rest of Europe. The special case option provided Switzerland with the opportunity to
increase its foreign trade, but required a great deal of restraint in terms of foreign policymaking.
The pursuit of its second option, two-track isolationism, meant that Switzerland
would retreat from cooperating economically with Europe while also abandoning any
effort to participate in European political integration. Switzerland’s second option
allowed it to practice dual restraint. The second option offered Switzerland the ability to
protect the domestic market from foreign competition using government subsidies,
support for cartels and monopolies, much like the policies enacted during the 1930s.
Informal agreements between business leaders and the government ensured that a form of
“politics of concordance” would control Swiss foreign trade policy. 26 This path
inevitably would have led to powerful, pro-business interests assuming primacy over
policy-making, resulting in a sharp redistribution of the national income. Most assuredly,
such a situation would contribute to domestic instability and unrest.
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The third option open to Switzerland, European political integration, offered it a
chance to combine protectionist economic measures with active engagement in
international politics. Following this path most likely would have meant the renunciation
of Swiss neutrality. Abandoning neutrality was never an option. Furthermore, reversing
its progress toward economic openness and its embrace of free trade principles could
have produced serious repercussions for Switzerland’s businesses, banks, and industries.
Finally, pursuing the normal case option would have completely removed any
remnants of the Swiss “special case,” leading the small neutral to become just another
European state. Choosing this fourth option, like option three, would have led to a
complete renunciation of neutrality in the long term. The normal case path meant fully
integrating, both politically and economically, with the rest of Europe. The desires of
expanding foreign trade overshadowed the political ramifications of such openness. For
Switzerland, such a course of action would have been dangerous, if not outright foolish.
By choosing a unique, Swiss path toward integration with Europe (the special
case scenario), the small neutral has proved able to preserve its traditional, federated
system of government. While the Swiss have decided to remain apart from the European
Union, doing so has not resulted in economic or political isolation. Switzerland matters,
in the eyes of historian Jonathan Steinberg because of its genuinely skeptical outlook
towards the EU. Steinberg argues “that Switzerland gets the government it wants” which
demonstrates a sharp “contrast to the bloated Brussels bureaucracy.” 27 Furthermore,
Switzerland represents the “Europe that did not happen.” 28 The lesson to be gleaned
from Switzerland’s experience as a neutral is that the small state can serve as a micro-
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model for how best to govern the multi-national, multi-lingual EU. The decentralized
political structure of Switzerland offers insight into how the EU might govern itself more
effectively while maintaining regional autonomy and sovereignty.
Switzerland finally decided to join the United Nations in 2002. The Swiss public
decided the best way to preserve the Confederation was to continue to place greater
emphasis on an active foreign policy. Walter Kalin, a professor at Bern University
argues, “Switzerland can play a role that many larger countries cannot.” He believes that
Switzerland “can be a bridge builder.” 29 Additionally, a strong, reliable neutral like
Switzerland can rally support for contentious issues like reforming the bloated UN
bureaucracy, changing the way that organization deals with human rights violations, and
perhaps overhaul the inefficient apparatus of the Security Council. One professor at the
University of Geneva, René Schwok, argues, “Foreign countries are more likely to listen
to Switzerland as a mediator in UN reform.” Although Switzerland’s membership in the
UN requires it to participate in both military and economic sanctions, Schwok points out
that “It is less likely to have a hidden agenda as it is neither a member of the European
Union nor of NATO.” 30
The progress towards European integration forces Switzerland to confront the
same problems of identity it has faced since the Thirty Years’ War. Linguistic and
regional differences between German Switzerland and French Switzerland have injected
new life into the importance of Swiss neutrality. However, two Switzerlands exist. The
country is divided between those in French-speaking Switzerland who desire a more
active role in the European Union, and those in the German-speaking east who want the

29
30

International Herald Tribune 30 June 2005: 2.
Ibid., 2.

133

country to remain isolated. Thus, the limits of a more active Swiss foreign policy are
affected by the degree of openness within domestic politics.
In an interesting twist of fate, Switzerland faces the exact same issues that had
divided the nation during the 1930s. The failed experiment with differential neutrality
might not have been as catastrophic as politicians of the Second World War imagined.
One cannot help but speculate that such a differential form of neutrality that allowed for
economic integration with the international community during the League of Nations era
might have best served Switzerland during the Second World War. Had the nation
continued on its path of differential neutrality, the economic manipulation that
Switzerland confronted might have been avoided. Regardless, it remains imperative that
Switzerland interpret its neutrality policy as a living organism, and not as a sacred,
unalterable dogma.
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